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After the financial crisis, there has been considerable 
debate about the role of corporations in society. It 
has become broadly accepted that corporations 
- particularly the world’s largest publicly traded 
corporations – need to be governed with respect 
for the society and the environment. This is 
because corporations are dependent on the broader 
institutional and systemic framing for their long-term 
survival and because the most pressing of society’s 
problems cannot be solved without a contribution 
from corporations or by regulation alone.
However, this consensus has not yet been reflected 
in mainstream corporate governance models that 
have been narrowing since the 1970s in order to put 
the maximisation of shareholder value at the centre 
of corporate attention. As a result, the normative 
and theoretical framework of corporate governance 
theory and practice continue to encourage excessive 
risk taking at the expense of corporate resilience 
and the ability to create long-term sustainable value. 
This framework takes away a focus on investment in 
R&D and innovation, and in human and social capital. 
It also diminishes the capacity of corporations to 
anticipate and mitigate systemic risks. Beyond 
corporations, this model for corporate governance 
damages the interests of long-term shareholders and 
their end beneficiaries as well as States. In a broader 
sense, it contributes to rising inequality within firms 
and in society at large, and to a range of negative 
environmental and social impacts.
With this context in mind, the Purpose of the 
Corporation Project, an initiative of Frank Bold with 
the support of the Modern Corporation Project 
at Cass Business School, launched the Corporate 
Governance for a Changing World Roundtable 
Series on corporate governance. Events were held in 
Breukelen, Brussels, London, New York, Oslo, Paris, 
and Zurich. This brought together more than 260 
leaders in business management, investment, regula-
tion and academic and civil society communities with 
the aim of identifying desired outcomes and princi-
ples of corporate governance fit for the challenges of 
the 21st century.
The roundtables sought to answer a number of 
central questions, the results of which have been 
synthesised into this report: 
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 → How can corporate governance contribute to 
robust long-term value creation for companies? 
 → What is the role of stakeholders, including 
shareholders, in fostering a long-term focus on 
sustainable behaviour? 
 → What incentives for short-termism exist in 
law, corporate governance codes and business 
practice?
Building on the expertise of leading practitioners and 
academics in both the U.S. and Europe, the roundta-
bles identified desired outcomes and key principles 
for a new model of corporate governance capable 
of achieving these objectives. The roundtable par-
ticipants provided examples of leading corporations 
that are already guided by these principles, demon-
strating that this approach is not only possible but 
can also give corporations a competitive edge leading 
to better economic performance as well as to better 
long-term results in capital markets. The principal 
conclusion of this process was that the goal of the 
corporation should be to create long-term sustain-
able value for customers and shareholders, while still 
contributing to societal well-being and environmen-
tal sustainability. These objectives can be mutually 
reinforcing. 
The roundtables confirmed that corporate law across 
all jurisdictions offers considerable scope in terms of 
the purpose of a corporation. The fiduciary duties of 
directors are typically not owed to the shareholders 
but rather toward the corporation itself, whereas the 
interests of shareholders are satisfied as a by-product 
of the success of the corporation. Even in jurisdic-
tions where directors owe duties of loyalty and care 
to the shareholders as well as to the corporation, the 
business judgment rule entitles directors to take ac-
count of a broad range of issues which they consider 
will further the interests of the corporation.
However, the permissive character of corporate law 
does not translate easily into practice. The dominant 
corporate governance model persistently directs 
the focus of executives and boards on short-term 
increases of market value. Within this framing, the 
roundtables recognised that culture and leadership 
remain the driving forces and key elements for the 
corporation to successfully achieve change. However, 
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this process is restricted by the institutional setting 
in which corporations operate. 
Taking this framing as the point of departure, the 
roundtables discussed a comprehensive set of 
options available to corporations, investors and 
policy-makers to create an institutional framework 
for corporate governance that supports a broad 
understanding of corporate purpose and fosters a 
focus of corporate strategy on long-term sustainable 
value. 
These options are presented in this report in seven 
sections:
 → Embedding purpose in the governance structure 
of the corporation.
 → Clarifying fiduciary duties to restore the focus to 
long-term value creation.
 → Strengthening the role of the board to pursue a 
broad and long-term view of corporate purpose.
 → Revising incentive structures for directors and 
executives.
 → Engaging stakeholders in corporate governance.
 → Improving shareholder engagement to foster 
patient capital.
 → Integrating intangibles, non-financial capitals 
and ESG matters into corporate accounting and 
reporting models.
In these interconnected areas, the roundtables 
offered six sets of recommendations.
Firstly, corporations may choose to reflect their 
purpose and long-term focus in their governance 
structure, for instance by embedding these into 
their articles of association, choosing to register 
as a benefit corporation or seek B Corp status. 
Other options to reflect their purpose are to set 
up a dual class share system, vest voting shares in 
a foundation established to oversee a company’s 
purpose or engage stakeholder interests in the 
board. Policy-makers can facilitate these changes by 
amending corporate law to reflect best practices in 
other jurisdictions. 
Secondly, the content of fiduciary duties, in 
particular with respect to the long-term success of 
the company, the focus on long-term sustainable 
value creation, stakeholder interests, ESG matters 
and systemic risks can be clarified by corporations, 
and, where appropriate, policy-makers. A clarified 
stipulation of duties - connected to an articulated 
corporate purpose - can be reflected in a corporation’s 
governance documents, strategic objectives, KPIs, 
reporting and executive incentive systems. 
Thirdly, the interests of corporate stakeholders, in 
particular those that are essential to a corporation’s 
long-term success can be reflected in a more compre-
hensive way in corporate governance arrangements. 
The roundtables considered that corporations could 
engage employee representatives and long-term 
investors with a proven track record of responsible 
engagement in their board or provide them with 
consultation rights. Corporations may also choose 
to reflect the interests of the stakeholders who can-
not be directly engaged, such as the environment or 
people affected in global supply chains. This could 
be achieved by assigning responsibility to particular 
board members and establishing appropriate moni-
toring mechanisms. 
Fourthly, shareholders do not form a homogenous 
group with the same interests, agendas and capacities 
to engage in corporate governance. A corporate 
governance system that focuses on shareholder 
rights without further qualification amplifies the 
ability of parties with a short-term interest to engage. 
In response, boards could formulate a strategy 
of encouraging or discouraging specific types of 
investors. Similarly, policy-makers could adopt 
regulations that allow corporations to differentiate in 
their engagement with types of shareholders.  
Fifthly, corporate accounting and reporting could 
reflect a corporation’s long-term value creation 
strategy by taking into account non-financial capitals, 
intangible assets and ESG matters and by addressing 
the systemic risks related to a corporation’s business. 
KPIs and incentive systems could be aligned with 
such a reporting system. Institutional investors can 
monitor corporate performance in terms of their 
capacity for long-term value creation and use the 
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KPIs as benchmarks for their voting strategies, taking 
into account the interests of their end beneficiaries. 
Finally, the academic curricula of corporate law, 
management, accounting and economics could be 
developed in such a way that they reflect a broad 
understanding of corporate purpose.     
By organising the roundtables within multiple 
European jurisdictions and the U.S., and by involving 
main corporate governance actors and stakeholders, 
the report provides an empirical basis for comparative 
corporate governance, which assesses the strengths 
of best practices in their own jurisdictional setting. 
However, the cross-jurisdictional empirical basis 
for this report also indicates that it cannot present 
the final word on which corporate governance 
arrangements are the most effective. Different 
options and practices will be more appropriate in 
specific jurisdictions and for specific corporations. 
Further investigation and debate is necessary to 
elaborate further on how to reconfigure and integrate 
the key elements identified in this report into actual 
practice and policy-making.
Nevertheless, the report presents an emerging 
comprehensive approach to corporate governance 
that can assist corporations to focus on a broad 
understanding of their purpose, long-term 
sustainable value, building resilience, and sustaining a 
strong social license. This approach can be beneficial 
to a wide set of stakeholders who take part in or are 
affected by corporate governance, because it allows 
for the alignment between corporate strategies and 
the broader interests of society by taking account of 
systemic risks such as climate change and growing 
inequality.

Section I                   
Introduction
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Introduction
Perhaps the most important question for the economy is thinking through how corporations3 should be 
managed and for what ends.4 Today we face complex challenges that cannot be addressed by govern-
ments or civil society alone, such as growing inequality, climate change, doing business within the limits 
of the planet’s resource boundaries and negotiating the complicated relationship between economic glo-
balisation, development, and human rights. As corporations form the fabric of contemporary economies, 
corporate governance systems are central to the way economies function and their governance is of 
critical importance for engaging with these issues.
As concepts that would serve the public good, the stock exchange and notably the publicly traded corpo-
ration originated in the 17th century.5 The global financial crisis showed to what extent the originally public 
purpose of these concepts has been lost. In the post-financial crisis period, there has been considerable 
debate about how to create an opportunity to discuss the idea of public corporations and to find ways to 
align stakeholders in this debate towards a beneficial and forward-looking model. 
The current phenomenon whereby corporations often fail to consider the long-term, as well as systemic 
risks and social and environmental challenges, can be traced to the fact that mainstream corporate govern-
ance models have narrowed since the 1970s. Today, they typically identify the purpose of the corporation 
as the maximisation of shareholder value, as measured by share price.6 The growing tendency of capital 
markets to focus on the short-term then puts the realisation of immediate market value at the centre of 
corporate attention. As a result, the normative and theoretical framework of corporate governance theory 
and practice now encourage excessive risk taking at the expense of long-term wealth creation, society and 
sustainability.7 
In the last decade it has become broadly accepted that corporations - particularly the world’s largest 
publicly traded corporations8 – need to be governed with respect for the society and the environment. 
This is partly because corporations are dependent on the broader institutional and systemic framing for 
their long-term survival and partly because the most pressing of society’s problems cannot be solved 
by regulation alone without a contribution from corporations. There is a growing recognition that the 
goal of the corporation should be to create real value for customers and wealth for shareholders, while 
contributing to societal well-being and environmental sustainability. These objectives should be mutu-
ally reinforcing.9 The challenge of finding a manageable and acceptable solution to attain these often 
contradictory goals forms the basis for this report, which reflects a trans-continental debate on the future 
of corporate governance.
With this context in mind, the Purpose of the Corporation Project (“project”), launched a Corporate 
Governance for a Changing World Roundtable Series (“roundtables” or “roundtable series”) on corporate 
governance with events in Breukelen (the Netherlands), Brussels, London, New York, Oslo, Paris, and 
Zurich.10  All of the roundtables were hosted by institutions with the joint aim to reflect on the role of 
corporations in society. The full list of institutions is provided in the acknowledgments. The objective of 
the roundtables was to identify the principles of corporate governance fit for the challenges of the 21st 
century through a unique discussion that was global in scope but tailored to the particular characteristics 
of each region.
The roundtable series brought together more than 260 thought leaders in business management, invest-
ment, regulation and academic and civil society communities (“roundtable participants”). This, in order 
to identify the key outcomes of corporate governance towards which we should be moving, any potential 
barriers and the best practices for how to reach such desired outcomes.
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The roundtables sought to answer a number of central questions, the results of which are synthesised in 
this report:
 → How can corporate governance contribute to robust long-term value creation for corporations?
 → What is the role of stakeholders, including shareholders, in fostering a long-term focus on sustainable 
behavior?
 → What incentives for short-termism exist in law, corporate governance codes and business practice? 
The project’s first step was the publication of five succinct statements, developed and endorsed by lead-
ing experts. These statements related to company law, management, accounting, economics, and politics. 
Each statement detailed how the contemporary corporate governance framework, and specifically its 
exclusive focus on shareholder value, affected the interests of other constituencies, the corporations itself 
and paradoxically, of the shareholders. These statements provided the roundtables with the problematisa-
tion of the current practice.
The roundtables were held under the Chatham House Rule.11 Prominent speakers introduced the subject, 
followed by an open discussion and a backcasting exercise.12 After each roundtable a draft report with the 
main outcomes was sent out for further input by academics, leading to a final report for each jurisdiction 
where a roundtable was held. Finally, each jurisdictional report was sent out to roundtable participants for 
approval. This final report presents a summary of reflections and best practices from all the roundtables, 
structured according to the main issues of the debate. 
By organising the roundtables within multiple European jurisdictions and the US and by involving main 
corporate governance actors and stakeholders, the report provides an empirical basis for comparative 
corporate governance.  It assesses the strengths of best practices on their own merits and in their own 
institutional setting. Taking into account the unique characteristics and contributions of each individual 
jurisdiction, these best practices provide the basis for a comprehensive set of interrelated proposals that 
can be used to improve corporate governance theory and practice. 
This emerging approach to corporate governance can be beneficial to corporations, investors and other 
practitioners, as well as to a wider set of stakeholders who take part or are affected by corporate gov-
ernance. It could help corporations to focus on a broad and long-term oriented understanding of their 
purpose, on creating long-term sustainable value, building resilience, and sustaining a strong social license, 
by aligning their strategies with the interests of society and taking into account systemic risks such as 
climate change and growing inequality.
However, the cross-jurisdictional empirical basis for this report also indicates that it cannot present the 
final word on what corporate governance arrangements are most effective for implementing a broad 
understanding of corporate purpose and for fostering long-term sustainable value creation. Different op-
tions and practices will be more appropriate in specific jurisdictions and for specific corporations. Further 
investigation and debate is necessary to elaborate how to reconfigure and integrate the key elements 
identified in this report into practice and in policy-making.
The report presents the outcomes of the debate from the roundtable series in several sections. 
 → Section II gives an overview and framing of the main issues in contemporary corporate governance 
and practice. 
 → Section III describes the role of leadership, culture, and soft law including how corporate purpose 
is actually defined in law. The section continues with a description of the options for embedding 
purpose in the governance structure of the corporation through governance documents and share 
structure. 
 → Section IV focuses on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and institutional investors with 
respect to purpose, systemic risks and sustainability. 
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 → Section V addresses the role of the board in the relation to corporate purpose. 
 → Section VI outlines options for improving incentive structures for directors and executives by reflect-
ing corporation’s long-term interests. 
 → Section VII looks at the ways in which other stakeholders and interests may be reflected in corpo-
rate governance. Section VIII discusses how to harness the potential positive impact of shareholder 
engagement while containing the risks of short-termism associated with shareholder activism. 
Additionally, it addresses how to encourage long-term and sustainable investment. 
 → Finally, section IX presents the debate on corporate reporting and accounting models, addressing 
integration of financial and ESG information in corporate strategy. Governance and implementation 
advice is included in this final section. 
Each section includes a summary with recommendations. In addition, all recommendations are presented 
together in a dedicated section after the conclusion.
13Report of a Global Roundtable Series

Section II  
Framing of 
current debates 
on corporate 
governance
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Framing of current debates on 
corporate governance
To start the debate on the revision of corporate governance, this section provides a short overview of 
current debates in corporate governance with a focus on the effects of shareholder primacy. Broadly, 
corporate governance may be understood as: 
 → How corporations are administered and structured
 → By whom: the issue of corporate control
 → By what: institutions, laws, regulations & markets
 → For whom: for what purpose
The answers to these basic questions provide a structure for procedures and processes that direct and 
control business.13 Accordingly, the corporate governance model in use is crucial for a broad range of 
issues, both inside and outside the corporation. Over time, different corporate governance models have 
been developed that answer these questions in different ways.14 From the 1970s onwards, mainstream 
corporate governance models have gradually narrowed toward identifying the purpose of the corporation 
to the maximisation of shareholder value.15
The shareholder primacy model’s limited understanding of corporate purpose brought with it a restricted 
interpretation of the legitimate scope of managerial discretion.16 American economist Milton Friedman 
argued that shareholder primacy requires boards to consider that any goal but shareholder value creation 
is outside the valid scope of its strategy.17 This notion couples shareholder primacy to a normative model 
for corporate strategy, which creates pressure on executive managers to ignore ESG factors and systemic 
risks and to pass the unaccounted costs of such a short-term approach onto broader society - what 
economists call negative externalities.18
Shareholder primacy rapidly became the normative focus for corporate governance theory and practice 
by being adopted into the curricula of many law and management schools, accounting theory, corporate 
governance codes and incentive structures.19 This approach to corporate governance has materialized in a 
focus facilitating and encouraging the monitoring of corporate performance by markets, the rise of inves-
tor activism in relation to corporate strategy, increasingly short shareholding periods,20 growing pressure 
on fund managers to provide financial returns in the short run,21 pressure for quarterly reporting,22 an 
increasing focus on the use of stock options for executive compensation23 and a decrease in CEO tenure. 
This broad institutional change has caused boards and executives to adopt short-term strategies24 that 
increase the payout ratio to shareholders, mostly by raising the proportion of corporate profits spent on 
dividends and share buybacks, and by engaging in M&A transactions.25 
Shareholder value as a model for corporate governance helps to focus managerial activity on lifting the 
immediate market valuation of the firm. However, it can induce excessive risk-taking at the expense of 
long-term value creation26 and to the detriment of other stakeholders.27
The significant risks of this model have become visible in their effects on corporations and on broader 
society:
 → Resilience - The increasing focus on the role of investors in corporate governance and the develop-
ment of a market for corporate control makes public corporations increasingly susceptible to financial 
cycles and the volatility of financial markets,28 while also strongly influencing the strategic orientation 
of boards. Shareholder primacy focuses investors and CEOs on market perceptions, turning “the 
corporation itself as a unique, economically productive entity, as an actor in the real economy” into 
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“a significantly unimportant factor in the typical investor’s buy and sell decisions”.29 Academic studies 
show how this focus leads boards and managerial executives to engage in allocating an increasing 
percentage of profits to dividends and share buybacks.30 In turn, this hollows out the capacity of 
corporations to re-invest and secure their long-term existence.31
 → R&D and innovation – Shareholder value as an exclusive strategic focus limits funds available for 
research and development. This impacts negatively on productive investment, dampens innovation 
and in the long run reduces competitive advantage.32
 → Human and Social Capital – Shifting profits to CEO remuneration and shareholder value can come 
at the expense of investment in employees,33 whose skills and motivations play a crucial role in cor-
poration success. Such shifting of priorities also undermines the social license of corporations and 
potentially adversely affects access to resources, cooperation with public authorities, ability to attract 
talent, and, not least, the quality of relations with customers and other affected groups.34
 → Recognising and mitigating systemic risks – The short-term focus endemic to shareholder primacy 
prevents corporations from anticipating the materialisation of systemic risks and building a long-term 
strategy that would mitigate the impact of such risks.
According to Larry Fink, CEO at Blackrock, short-term perspectives are taken at the expense of “innova-
tion, skilled work forces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth.”35 In 
the wake of the financial crisis, it became widely recognised that the constant pressure for short-term 
market-oriented results created an environment that presented risks to those corporations.36 In practice, 
such pressures are driving increasing numbers of publicly traded corporations to leave the open market 
and become private corporations.37
In the roundtables, there was broad recognition38 that shareholder primacy presented a problematic 
theory of the corporation and of corporate governance. It was aptly termed “one of the fundamental 
fault lines of our economic model” by Roger Barker in the London roundtable.39 In addition to the range 
of impacts on corporations outlined above, there has been further impact on innovation40 and economic 
growth41 and an increase of systemic risks hampering the potential for corporations to play a beneficial 
role in society.42
More specifically, shareholder primacy is associated with the following implications for society: 
 → Long-term shareholders and end beneficiaries – Because a strategic focus on the short term comes 
at the expense of a focus on long-term development of the corporation43 investors with a long-term 
perspective are typically not served by shareholder primacy. Damaging the long-term interests of 
corporations also hurts end beneficiaries with a long-term horizon for their investment, mostly people 
who are saving to fund retirement or support their children’s education.44
 → Tax - Shareholder primacy has led some boards of directors to believe that they have an obligation 
to reduce their corporations’ tax liabilities by engaging in tax avoidance. The most notable recent 
examples are provided by the Luxleaks and Panama Papers scandals. These practices externalise risk 
by reducing the corporate tax quote and thereby indirectly increasing the tax bill paid by citizens and 
local corporations.45 Reducing the tax income of states reduces the capacity of states to invest in 
infrastructure, education, and R&D.46 
 → Inequality - Shareholder primacy produces pressure to increase the share of corporate revenue go-
ing to profits. This is often done by creating precarious contract conditions for employees and by 
avoiding or reneging on implicit and long-term aspects of contracts, such as health care coverage, 
career ladders and progression, and pension liabilities. In combination with tax avoidance, shareholder 
primacy is connected to growing income inequality, both within corporations47 and in the broader 
economy. 48
 → Sustainability - The systemic risks connected to environmental sustainability can be expressed by 
the concept of planetary boundaries,49 which, in a business context, gives rise to the risks of stranded 
assets, climate change, and scarcity of resources. These issues are being increasingly recognised by 
the insurance and investor communities.50 
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Building a stronger corporate governance model
At the Zurich roundtable, it was suggested that “the role of corporate governance is not only to protect 
the corporation but to ensure that a corporation is able to create value for society at large.”51 Paul 
Polman, CEO of Unilever, has similarly argued that sustainability is not only compatible with profitability, 
but indispensable for a corporation’s success in the long-term.52 The roundtable participants further 
considered that a desirable corporate governance model would see the creation of real value for 
customers53 and shareholder wealth creation as joint and mutually reinforcing objectives.54 This model 
embraces environmental sustainability and societal well-being,55 takes into account systemic risks and 
opportunities56 and adopts both financial and ESG benchmarks57 to measure corporate performance 
over the long-term.58
Summary
Recommendations
Over time, different corporate governance models have been created to answer the 
questions how, by whom, by what and for whom corporate governance should organise 
the procedures and processes that direct and control business. From the 1970s onwards, 
mainstream corporate governance models have narrowed so that the purpose of the 
corporation has been reduced to the maximisation of shareholder value. The narrowing 
in perception of the legitimate scope of corporate purpose and managerial discretion 
have focused boards and executives to adopt short-term strategies that increase the 
payout ratio to shareholders. This is mostly done by raising the proportion of corporate 
profits spent on dividends and share buybacks, by engaging in M&A transaction and by 
increasing externalities. This focus on excessive risk-taking is at the expense of other 
stakeholders and of long-term value creation. 
This shift towards shareholder value and short-term strategies has had a number of 
adverse effects on corporations and on broader society, and has, amongst others, con-
tributed to the following:
 → Reallocation of risks and rewards to a small set of corporate constituencies, contrib-
uting to growing inequality.
 → Undermined corporate resilience and diminished their ability to create value in the 
long-term and invest in R&D and human and social capital.
 → Slower innovation and economic growth.
 → Diminished capacity to anticipate and mitigate systemic risks that threaten the 
whole of society, such as climate change and financial crises.
 → Reduced the potential for corporations to play a beneficial role in society.
The different roundtables recognised that shareholder primacy is a problematic model 
for corporate governance. It induces short-termism and leads to a disconnection be-
tween short and long term goals in business strategy. The roundtables concluded that 
the role of corporate governance is not only to protect the corporation but also to en-
sure that a corporation is able to create long-term sustainable value for society at large. 
Moreover, the roundtables clearly expressed that there is a need to build a stronger 
corporate governance model, which should aim to: 
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 → Create real value for customers and wealth for shareholders as joint and mutually 
reinforcing objectives.
 → Take account of environmental sustainability and societal well-being.
 → Take into account systemic risks and opportunities.
 → Adopt both financial and ESG benchmarks to measure corporate performance over 
the long-term.

Section III  
Engaging with 
corporate 
governance
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Engaging with corporate 
governance
To begin the process of developing a new model for corporate governance, the participants in all round-
tables discussed culture and leadership as important elements of a broader concept of corporate govern-
ance and in order to achieve change. Broad sections of the literature on corporate governance confirm 
the centrality of culture,59 while the draft Dutch Corporate Governance Code and the new South African60 
code see culture as the ‘driving force’ of the corporation and argue that it is impossible to run a successful 
business without considering its values.
Important features of culture, such as accountability and openness, are seen as essential to the success of 
the corporation because they help to gather information internally as well as on the constantly evolving 
external business environment.61 In this spirit, New York roundtable participants argued that the ‘tone 
from the top’ was key for taking long-term oriented decisions and addressing sustainability challenges, 
while participants at the Zurich roundtable argued that corporations should improve corporate culture 
and values, and use them proactively.62
The roundtables also recognised that a healthy culture requires a strong ethos, usually inspired by re-
spected leaders. Although such a culture cannot be mandated from outside, it does rely on support from 
the institutional setting in which leaders and corporations operate. In this framing, systemic change is 
hard to achieve by only encouraging leadership and a change of culture if the prevailing perspective in 
corporate governance practice and regulation remains geared towards shareholder primacy. This is also 
the case if the focus on short-term share price increase has become embedded in the institutions that 
direct corporate governance theory and practice.63
What is needed, therefore, is a broader conceptualisation of the implicit assumptions that govern the 
direction of corporate governance and the scope for corporate strategy. This conceptualisation starts 
with the purpose of the corporation. 
Corporate purpose in law
Since the 1970s, the idea that corporations exist solely for the benefit of their shareholders has become 
dominant.64 The idea was developed first in U.S. academia and, in the 1980s and 1990s, was increasingly 
adopted in business and policy-making.65 In continental Europe, this notion has been less successful in 
altering the common perception that corporations generally exist to serve society. Nevertheless, it was 
gradually adopted in academic curricula and in the regulation of corporate governance and accounting. 
The problem with the idea of shareholder primacy is that it does not match the legal foundation of the 
corporation. Shareholders have certain unique rights relating to organisation and control of the corpora-
tion,66 but the notion that shareholders own corporations outright is not consistent with corporate law 
in any jurisdiction worldwide.67 Similarly, the idea that shareholders are prioritised claimants to corporate 
value, either through residual claims or through claims of efficiency, are contentious.68 
For various historical reasons, shareholders in public corporations have rather limited and restricted 
claims to control.69 Claims to shareholder primacy - and associated claims to corporate control and to 
corporate value for shareholders - are unfounded in terms of their theoretical underpinning in law. Further, 
they are problematic in relation to the possibilities and protections that the public corporation offers to 
various constituencies.70
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Corporate law across all jurisdictions offers considerable scope in terms of the purpose of a corporation.71 
A corporate purpose may be whatever its founders wish to embed in the corporation’s constitution and 
culture, as long as it is legal. A corporation may decide to maximise quarterly profits and short-term share 
price or may choose to make innovative products, develop cutting edge technology, build a spaceship, 
create the next antibiotic, foster a great working environment for employees, drive the shift to renewable 
energy or one of many other objectives.72 The key is that the purpose is permissive to a broad range of 
subjects and is not required by law.
The defining attribute of a corporation is that it is a legal entity,73 separate from its key stakeholders, 
including its shareholders and which benefits from specific privileges and protections.74 The (fiduciary) 
duties75 of executives are not owed to the shareholders but rather to the corporation itself.76 The interests 
of shareholders are satisfied as a by-product of the success of the corporation. For example, Swiss law 
states that the responsibility of management and directors is towards the success of the company.77 
Under UK law, which since 2006 has explicitly mandated directors to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members (shareholders) whilst having regard to various wider concerns, the duty is 
owed to the company rather than the shareholders directly. In the EU context, the EU Takeover Directive 
stipulates a duty for directors to act in the interests of “the company as a whole”.78 
The principle that directors’ duties are owed to the corporation, rather than (exclusively) to shareholders, 
has important implications for enforcement79 and for corporate governance. Even in US corporate law, 
including in states like Delaware, where the directors owe duties of loyalty and care to the corporation as 
well as directly to its shareholders, directors are entitled to take account of any stakeholder interest they 
consider will further the interests of the corporation and in doing so they are protected by the business 
judgment rule.80
Taking the fiduciary duties toward ‘the corporation’ as the point of departure, the roundtable participants 
argued that the generic purpose of the public corporation from a practical point of view is to be successful 
over a long-term period and in doing this, ought to satisfy the interests of all its stakeholding constituen-
cies.81 This was reflected in the discussion on the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, which states: 
“The Code is based on the principle generally applied in the Netherlands that a company is a long-term 
alliance between the various stakeholders of the company. Stakeholders are groups and individuals who, 
directly or indirectly, influence – or are influenced by – the attainment of the company’s objectives: em-
ployees, shareholders and other lenders, suppliers, customers, the public sector and civil society. The 
management board and the supervisory board have overall responsibility for weighing up these interests, 
generally with a view to ensuring the continuity of the company and its affiliated enterprise, as the com-
pany seeks to create long-term value for all stakeholders.”82
Therefore, in holding fiduciary duties toward ‘the corporation’ a board is required to maintain a healthy 
balance between the interests of the corporation’s stakeholders and to society at large. What is more, 
this requirement should follow from and be embedded in corporate governance institutions, rather than 
voluntary CSR.83
Embedding purpose in the governance structure of a 
corporation
Corporations that wish to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner can help to safeguard their 
strategy and ensure that their governance respects the best interests of all corporate constituencies by 
clarifying their purpose in key governance documents, including – if possible – constitutional documents 
such as articles of association. To give effect to such provisions, the documents should also clarify the 
rights and responsibilities of corporate governance actors, in particular directors and shareholders, and 
possibly other stakeholders.
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A clear statement of purpose may:
 → Introduce legal clarity in relation to pursuing specific goals, including those related to the social and 
environmental issues connected to the corporation’s business,
 → Frame directors’ fiduciary duties and liabilities,
 → Clarify which audiences and matters the corporation directors consider material for the corporation,84 
 → Introduce clarity about the investment and payout horizon to investors; and
 → Allow corporations to pursue long-term strategies (especially those involving R&D which entail a high 
degree of uncertainty, or reacting to systemic risks).85
The statement of purpose could be supported by a new director/board duty to develop long-term plans 
specifying how this purpose will be fulfilled. In this respect, statements of purpose might cover environ-
mental, social or scientific goals. Statements could also refer to planetary boundaries, international law or 
other external standards.
In the Dutch roundtable, it was suggested that the corporate statement of purpose could be revisited at 
annual stakeholder meetings, which resemble annual general meetings with additional stakeholders. This 
would allow corporation and stakeholders to arrive at a shared understanding of corporate purpose.86
Policymakers can foster this practice through supportive changes to corporate law. In this respect, cor-
porate law may:
 → Allow corporations to implement changes to their purpose and governance to reflect a broader 
purpose and use a ‘mission-lock’ to secure those changes.87 This could be achieved by requiring a 
supermajority of shareholder votes to change relevant provisions.88
 → Allow corporations to specify their long-term social purposes in constitutional documents to ensure 
the accountability of directors to shareholders for implementing plans to meet these purposes and to 
provide protection against shareholder proposals that contravene the corporate purpose.89
 → Recognise a director duty to develop long-term plans to meet specific societal objectives relevant for 
their corporation e.g. to take into account the planetary boundaries and annually report to sharehold-
ers on how these plans are being implemented. 
The first steps in this direction may be found in recent developments of corporate law and corporate 
governance codes around the world. For example, the latest drafts of corporate governance codes in the 
Netherlands90 and South Africa91 have explicitly moved to adopt a broad purpose for the corporation. 
Another important element is the broadening of reporting standards to include ESG matters. The EU 
Non-Financial Reporting Directive92 stipulates that large public corporations should include the following 
in their annual reports: information on their position, development, performance, and the potential impact 
on environmental, social, human rights and corruption issues.
One way for corporations to embed a broader purpose into their mission is by making use of the Benefit 
Corporation legal form, when available, or other legal forms that make it easier for corporations to pursue 
societal objectives, such as cooperatives.93 Thirty U.S. states and Italy have authorised the new voluntary 
for-profit corporate form of Benefit Corporations, which incorporates the following elements: a require-
ment to create general public benefit, for which directors are accountable to shareholders; a duty of 
directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders; and an obligation to report on their social and 
environmental performance against their commitment to create public benefit. The Benefit Corporation 
legal form allows protections for other constituencies, for example against derivative suits and other 
types of pressure from activist investors, as well as commitments to responsible, sustainable conduct, 
both of which can be enforced by shareholders.94
These examples demonstrate the potential of corporate law, which could be developed further to clarify 
what is expected of corporations and their directors with respect to their relationship with society.
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Dual-class share structure and industrial foundations
The roundtable participants recognised that demands for the maximisation of short-term performance 
are of particular concern for boards in markets that do not permit protection against takeovers95 and for 
boards of corporations that do not have a major controlling shareholder.96 Two options were identified 
for corporations to use share ownership and voting rights to protect their purpose: adopting a dual-
class share structure with differentiated voting rights and vesting voting shares in a foundation set up to 
oversee corporate purpose.
A dual-class share structure allows the designation of one class of shares as having voting rights while the 
second class of common shares typically has no or limited voting rights. The benefits of a dual-class share 
structure include that it allows corporations to retain control over long-term business strategy and vision, 
and to resist takeover bids by allotting these shares to the founders, employees or other limited groups of 
patient and informed stakeholders, who understand the corporation’s strategy and are prepared to take 
the longer term view in the face of uncertainty under potentially difficult financial circumstances.
Dual class share structures are particularly common in Scandinavia but also within Silicon Valley tech-
nology firms, representing approximately 7% of all public corporations, including Google, Facebook and 
Amazon, as well as media conglomerates such as the New York Times.97 In the London roundtable, Roger 
Barker of the UK Institute of Directors argued that “multiple voting structures should be permitted on 
the London Stock Exchange to allow UK-listed companies to compete with their rivals in the US and Asian 
technology industries, provided the process is transparent and appropriate to the company.”98 
Another way to engage with dual class share structures in relation to corporate purpose is to use an 
industrial foundation structure.99 The Danish pharmaceutical corporation Novo Nordisk, for example, has 
listed publicly traded common shares without significant voting rights, while a foundation retains control 
over approximately 25% of its share base, representing 75% of voting shares.100 This setup has allowed 
the corporation to retain its main purpose to cure diabetes and adopt a triple bottom line strategy. Novo 
Nordisk is one of the largest corporations by market capitalisation across the Nordic region and globally in 
the pharmaceutical sector.101 Other examples of globally competitive industrial and financial corporations 
with nonprofit foundations holding controlling interests include Carlsberg, Heineken, Ikea, and Triodos 
Bank. 
B corporations and performance standards
Another way to embed purpose is through B Corp certification. This requires that the corporation integrate 
a commitment (i.e. broader societal purpose) to stakeholders in its governing documents, similar to the 
Benefit Corporation legal form described above. In addition, B Corp certification provides a comprehensive 
model for embedding a broader, socially aligned purpose in the governance of a for-profit corporation.102 
Summary
The purpose of the corporation is central to the way a corporation operates. The breadth 
of corporate purpose determines a corporation’s ability to recognise, respect, and bal-
ance stakeholder needs, which are key to its long-term success, to operate in line with 
societal interests, and to maintain public trust and its social license to operate. However, 
corporate governance practice and regulation have been increasingly built on a narrow 
conception that the purpose of the corporation is to prioritise shareholders’ interests. 
This conception contributes to a short-termism that is harmful to the corporation as 
well as to society at large. It is not supported by corporate law, which makes the corpo-
rate entity the beneficiary of fiduciary duties, and allows (but in many jurisdictions does 
not require) a much broader perspective on the purpose of the corporation.
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The roundtables identified several options for corporations on how to protect their 
purpose:
 → Embed a clear statement of purpose and corresponding rights and responsibilities 
of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in a corporation’s governance 
documents and articles of incorporation.
 → Use dual-class share structures with differentiated voting rights, where available.
 → Vest voting shares in a foundation set up to oversee a corporation’s purpose.
 → Register as a Benefit Corporation or other alternative legal form established to 
protect social purpose or obtain B corporation certification.
The roundtables also identified how corporate law and corporate governance regulation 
can foster purpose driven corporations. Accordingly, this framework could:
 → Clarify in law and in corporate governance codes the societal purpose of corpora-
tions and their duties toward internal and external constituencies.
 → Allow corporations to protect their purpose in governance documents and 
arrangements.
 → Require corporations to specify their long-term social purposes in their constitu-
tional documents.
 → Recognise a director duty to develop long-term plans in order to meet specific soci-
etal objectives relevant for their corporation, and annually report to shareholders 
on how these plans are being fulfilled.
 → Allow for the use of dual class share structures and industrial foundations.
Recommendations
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Fiduciary duties of directors 
and institutional investors
The term fiduciary duty is used primarily in UK and US law but the basic concept of an obligation based 
on trust to act in the best interest of another person is widely held across both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. There are two separate forms of fiduciary duties that are relevant to improving corporate 
governance: those of institutional investors (such as pension fund trustees) and those of corporate direc-
tors.103 These are explored separately below. 
Corporate directors owe fiduciary obligations to the corporation.104 In this context, roundtable participants 
explored the reasons and the extent to which the content of fiduciary duty has become confused with 
serving the perceived interests of the corporation’s present shareholders and has been simplified to mean 
managing short-term market value increases. Roundtable participants also discussed how fiduciary duties 
toward the corporation could be used to restore the focus on long-term value creation.105  In the case 
of institutional investors, the key issue addressed in the roundtables was the challenge for institutional 
investors to identify and reflect the end beneficiaries’ interests in their strategy.106
The roundtables confirmed that corporate directors as well as institutional investors are legally permitted 
to take into account environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors as long as they are a part of 
legitimate business strategy.107 In this regard, systemic risk is the main issue that connects notions of 
corporate director fiduciary duties with the fiduciary duties of investors. A strong focus on short-term 
performance can destroy shareholder value in the long run because it hollows out the corporation and 
turns directors away from strategic considerations that mitigate corporation specific as well as systemic 
risk.
The roundtables explored options that corporations and investors can use to clarify fiduciary duties to-
ward the long-term and how policymakers can support this shift.
Fiduciary duties of corporate directors
Although there is significant difference in the ways that various countries approach corporate governance 
more broadly,108 the fundamental principles of directors’ duties and liabilities across Europe and in the 
U.S. are similar. In brief, corporate directors have a duty to act in the best interests of ‘the corporation’.109 
Similarly, the specific content of what a fiduciary duty is and to and by whom duties are owed, is a matter 
of legal debate, which has arrived at different conclusions in different jurisdictions.110 Nevertheless, the 
common cross-jurisdictional point surveyed in this project is that directors are permitted to focus on 
long-term value creation for the corporation to the benefit of its members, meaning all present as well as 
future shareholders.111
A recent study funded by the European Commission concluded: “Directors’ duties are owed primarily to 
the corporation, i.e. to the legal entity and not to the shareholders owning that entity. This basic principle 
is universally accepted and undisputed.”112 The same view has been voiced by leading corporate govern-
ance commentators in the US113 and elsewhere.114 Furthermore, the fiduciary duties of directors cannot be 
disentangled from a long-term perspective on the corporation as an ‘entity’, and the collection of interests 
from a number of corporate constituencies that this idea represents.115
Corporate law and corporate governance codes in various jurisdictions differ in how concretely they de-
scribe how directors should observe the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. Nevertheless 
to some extent they all recognise116 the duty to take their interests in account.117 To cite a prime example, 
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the Dutch Corporate Governance Code - Proposal for revision118 states: “The management board is ex-
pected to adopt a view on long-term value creation for the company” and “the value created should be 
for the long-term benefit of all stakeholders, including but not limited to shareholders and employees.”119
In accordance with this model, the roundtables recommended that corporations clearly acknowledge and 
publicly affirm that the duty of their directors is:
 → Toward the corporation as a whole;
 → To protect the long-term development of the corporation;
 → To avoid contributing to systemic risks that cause negative impacts on corporate stakeholders and 
society at large; and
 → To specify how stakeholders’ interests will be taken into account. 
The roundtables also discussed the necessary tools to embed this approach in a corporation’s governance 
documents, strategic objectives, key performance indicators (KPIs), reporting and executive incentive 
systems.120 These tools are presented in dedicated sections of this report.
Consideration of systemic risks and ESG factors
In all jurisdictions, directors are under obligation to proactively and critically evaluate the material financial 
risks and opportunities to their corporation. As it is undisputed that directors are legally permitted to 
take account of ESG factors,121 the roundtable participants discussed what the scope of this duty could 
be. In particular, this discussion pertained to environments where systemic issues are present i.e. climate 
change,122 growing inequality, stagnating economic growth and instability of the global financial system,123 
but where it is difficult to ascertain the impact of individual actors and where coordinated action is needed 
to mitigate these systemic risks.124
In addition to direct business risks, such as the risk of stranded assets or changing market conditions, 
and physical risks, such as scarcity of resources,125 the failure to consider environmental and social factors 
carries a number of other risks, including:
 → Regulatory risk: corporations that fail to act proactively with regard to changing legislation may face 
penalties or diminished value, e.g. as carbon emissions legislation is introduced and subsequently 
enforced. 
 → Shareholder activism risk: a growing number of shareholders (institutional investors, civil society 
groups, or trade unions) are using shareholder litigation to pursue corporations and their directors for 
material failures. Additionally, shareholders frequently use shareholder proposals and/or divestment 
campaigns to target corporations.126 
 → Litigation risk: affected stakeholders, including workers and local communities, use either local or 
transnational litigation against corporations who lose their social license to operate and may have 
violated relevant national or international norms, particularly in high risk industries such as mining. 
 → Reputational risk: rapidly evolving societal expectations regarding corporate behavior mean that 
corporations must react quickly and proactively to issues as they arise, e.g. allegations of modern 
slavery in supply chains.
The roundtables identified several strategies that directors can employ to be able to effectively react to 
these issues:
 → Evaluate salient environmental and social risks connected to the business of their corporation and 
articulate a business strategy that takes account of negative externalities produced by corporations.
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 → Assess and address systemic risks associated with the corporation (e.g. climate change and its im-
pact on a corporation’s viability) and develop policy on how to avoid or mitigate associated risks at 
corporation level.127
 → Develop a business strategy that connects the mitigation of systemic risks to the long-term develop-
ment of the corporation and its strategy.
Policymakers may encourage this focus by clarifying the content of fiduciary duties with respect to the 
concrete outcome in terms of systemic risks and the environmental and social issues relevant for par-
ticular industries, e.g. the production of financial stability for banks and other financial intermediaries;128 
the mitigation of environmental impacts for extractive corporations; and the development of fair and 
sustainable supply chain models for apparel corporations. They could take into account issues like en-
vironmental concerns, health and safety, human rights and corruption.129 Policymakers could also clarify 
director liability for any serious impact caused or contributed to by the corporation.130
Another way to embed systemic risks into corporate strategy is by linking them to ‘in control’ state-
ments.131 As directors must make business decisions that are in the best interests of the corporation as an 
ongoing entity, the notion of ‘in control’ could be coupled to disclosure of the risks associated with ESG 
issues (see also Section IX).
Fiduciary duties of institutional investors
Institutional investors play a crucial role in modern economy by permitting citizens to save for their fu-
tures and by generally contributing to the stability and long-term prosperity of our productive system. 
Through the active and passive investment policies they choose to adopt, institutional investors influence 
the extent to which corporate directors are able to adopt a broader concept of corporate purpose. At the 
same time, institutional investors also have a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of their beneficiaries.132 
Because they invest on behalf of a large number of small investors, in principle, their duty is long-term ori-
ented and should take account of the long-term viability of the systemic setting in which the investment 
is made.133 Nevertheless, institutional investors are under pressure to generate short-term returns and 
cannot automatically be relied upon to provide monitoring and engagement that will support long-term 
value creation for corporations (see Section VIII).
To provide support for aligning institutional investment with a long-term strategic horizon, the roundtable 
participants provided several suggestions:
1. In order to support long-term value creation and manage both their investee corporations’ and their 
own risk exposure, institutional investors should engage with boards and request that they address 
systemic risks.134
2. Public (dis-) engagement campaigns135 by investors can play an important role in convincing corpora-
tions to adopt ESG goals.136 In the Zurich roundtable,137 it was suggested that to incentivise corpora-
tions, investors can support their engagement strategies by positive publicity campaigns. Divestment 
can be used as a last resort option, should engagement fail.
3. ESG performance and attention to systemic risks correlate with superior long-term financial perfor-
mance.138 Institutional investors should therefore request that corporations integrate ESG factors in 
their reporting.139
4. The strategy of agents down the investment chain should be aligned with the specific investment 
strategy set by the institutional investor or by the beneficiaries.140
5. Policymakers can encourage institutional investors to pay greater attention to ESG matters and sys-
temic risks by requiring investors to adopt greater transparency in these matters with respect to their 
engagement strategy.141
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6. In several roundtables it was suggested that the role and responsibilities of fund managers and proxy 
advisers as well as analysts could be clarified.142
Summary
Recommendations
There are two distinct forms of fiduciary duties that are relevant to improving corporate 
governance: (1) those of corporate directors to promote the success of the corporation, 
owed to the corporation itself and (2) those of institutional investors (such as pension 
fund trustees) to act in the interest of their beneficiaries, owed to those beneficiaries.
The roundtables confirmed that corporate directors, as well as institutional investors, 
are legally permitted to take environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into 
account. Furthermore, in all jurisdictions, directors are under obligation to proactively 
and critically evaluate the material financial risks and opportunities to their corporation. 
Similarly, institutional investors like pension funds invest mostly on behalf of broad sets 
of small investors with a long-term horizon. As the duty of institutional investors is, in 
principle, long-term oriented, they should take account of the long-term viability of the 
systemic setting in which this investment is made and should be expected to provide 
monitoring and engagement that will support long-term value creation for corporations 
and their own beneficiaries. 
In practice, the expectation of boards and institutional investors to adopt a broader con-
cept of fiduciary duties is undermined by the prevailing corporate governance model. 
This model puts pressure on all parties involved in corporate governance, including 
boards and institutional investors, to focus on the short term.143 The failure to adopt 
a broader concept of fiduciary duties carries a number of risks. These may undermine 
the long-term viability of corporations and beneficiary expectations, including direct 
business and physical risks, regulatory risk, shareholder and stakeholder litigation, as 
well as a potential risk to reputation.
In this context, the roundtable participants identified several recommendations for how 
fiduciary duties can be used to restore the focus on long-term value creation:
Recommendations for corporations and their directors
 → Clearly acknowledge and publicly affirm that it is the duty of directors to:
•	 Protect the long-term development of the corporation; 
•	 Evaluate salient environmental and social risks connected to the business of their 
corporation;
•	 Mitigate negative impact on corporate stakeholders and society at large and to 
specify how stakeholders’ interests should be taken into account;
•	 Assess and address systemic risks associated with the corporation.
 → Reflect these duties and set objectives in a corporation’s governance documents, 
strategic objectives, KPIs, corporate reporting and executive incentive systems.
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 → Include systemic risks, sustainability and other relevant ESG factors in ‘in control’ 
statements. 
Recommendations regarding the fiduciary duties of institutional investors
 → Develop a strategy taking account of ESG matters, systemic risks, and engage with 
the boards of investee corporations, reflecting end-beneficiaries’ long-term interest 
and time horizons for the investment strategy. Integrate this strategy in internal 
incentive schemes.
 → Support engagement and/or disengagement strategies, as well as positive publicity 
campaigns.
 → Request the investee corporations to integrate ESG factors in their reporting.
 → Align the strategy of agents down the investment chain with the specific invest-
ment strategy set by the institutional investor.
Recommendations for policy-makers
 → Clarify the liability of directors for serious impacts caused or contributed to by the 
corporation. 
 → Clarify the content of fiduciary duties with respect to specific environmental and 
social issues relevant for particular industries, e.g. systemic financial stability in 
the case of banks, the mitigation of environmental impacts for extractive corpora-
tions, and the development of fair and sustainable supply chain models for apparel 
corporations.
 → Require greater transparency by investors regarding their engagement strategy 
with respect to ESG risks.
 → Clarify the role and responsibilities of fund managers and proxy advisers.
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Broader purpose and the board
The importance of boards for corporate governance theory and practice cannot be overestimated. Over 
the past decades, significant attention has been paid to formal and structural issues in corporate govern-
ance e.g. board composition and the separation of the role of Chair from the CEO and the role of non-
executive directors (“NEDs”). Boards, together with top executives, are understood as being responsible 
for displaying leadership and setting the tone of the corporate culture.144 Finally, many recommendations 
regarding organisational structure and the scope for operation of boards tend to be related to the struc-
ture and engagement of the shareholder constituency and the relationship between the board and the 
shareholders.
As the structure of boards, culture, role and composition of shareholders, and the types of institutional 
constraints that govern shareholder interactions with boards tend to differ significantly across the uni-
verse of listed corporations,145 the rules present in corporate governance codes often differ from the 
reality experienced by individual corporations.146
With this in mind, the roundtable participants identified several good practices that may help boards to 
put in place and operate with a broader and long-term framing of corporate purpose. The debate in the 
roundtables addressed the role of non-executive directors, board diversity, procedural aspects like term-
limits of board nomination and recall triggers. Issues of appointment, training, and certification were also 
discussed. In addition, roundtable participants discussed what collective responsibilities the board should 
have. Among these, the participants suggested that boards should be responsible for setting and oversee-
ing a corporation’s mission, its long-term value creation strategy, stakeholder consultations, assessing 
systemic risk and investigating complaints of major wrongdoing by the corporation.147
Non-executive directors
In the corporate governance debate, the importance of ‘independent directors’ or ‘non-executive direc-
tors’ (“NEDs”) is routinely highlighted.148 However, it remains habitually unclear what this ‘independence’ 
means and what purpose it might serve.149 Both ‘non-executive’ and ‘independent’ can refer to multiple 
ideas, including:
1. the provision of expertise and networks;150 
2. bringing a view from outside the boardroom, focusing on the corporation as a whole and its long-term 
interests; 
3. independence from the corporation itself152 and thus the provision of effective counterweight to 
(internal) executives with a director role;  and 
4. the idea that “NEDs” can stand in for or represent the interests of specific constituencies and 
stakeholders.
Whether “NEDs” can and will provide any or all of these roles is constrained by four main factors.153 First, 
there are recurring concerns about the skill base, knowledge set and limited range of backgrounds of non-
executive directors. Second, the assumption that “NEDs” are in a strategic position to provide sufficient 
counterweight to executives is constrained by time, low remuneration, and, specifically in the US, a strong 
position for executives to select board members. Third, as the description of boards’ fiduciary duties has 
shown, “NEDs” are required to, first and foremost, serve the corporation’s interest.154 In serving sectional 
interests, it could result in “NEDs” impinging on their legal mandate as directors. Fourth and more gener-
ally, as long as corporate governance theory and practice cling to the idea of shareholder primacy, the 
easiest and least risky way to serve the notion of ‘the corporation’s interest’ will be understood by “NEDs” 
as falling in line behind executives who choose to interpret the goal of serving ‘the corporation’ as serving 
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the goal of the short-term shareholders’ interest. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that “NEDs” will be 
a panacea for turning corporate strategy around to the issues identified in this report.155
Boards and strategic investors
In the roundtables, it was argued that boards could be mandated to create a better alignment between 
the expectations of boards and investors to guard against short-term pressures. This could be achieved 
by providing a clear narrative about what the board wishes to achieve and what types of investors the 
board would like to attract and possibly engage with.156 In the Zurich and New York roundtables, it was 
suggested that boards could use such a narrative to actively identify strategic investors with a consistent 
track record of responsible and long-term engagement with corporate strategy in other corporations. 
Boards could choose to give investors who are sympathetic to the long-term objectives pursued by the 
corporations more possibilities to engage.157 Conversely, Paul Polman from Unilever,158 Larry Fink from 
Blackrock  and Tim Cook from Apple160 have argued that boards could can actively discourage specific 
investors from becoming involved in a corporation. 
Board diversity
Academic research has confirmed a number of positive effects of increased board diversity161 including: 
improved access to relevant expertise and specialised knowledge, more effective problem-solving, reduced 
group think, better understanding of (global) markets, suppliers and customers, improved reputation 
by conforming to public expectations and better employee relations (by indicating that the corporation 
prioritises diversity and offers opportunities for advancement to all employees).162 The roundtable par-
ticipants observed trends towards increasingly globalised trade and corporate operations, toward fast 
technological development and to new social and environmental risks and opportunities. These trends 
were associated with changing business practices and with changing societal expectations and values. 
The roundtables broadly supported the necessity for a variety of backgrounds, knowledge and skills on 
boards to ensure they actively respond to these trends.163 In addition to gender,164 aspects such as age, 
nationality, expertise, work and educational background, professional qualifications and experience can 
improve discussions within the management board and supervisory board.165
Term limits and staggered boards
The use of term limits was considered in several roundtables. It was argued that terms for directors should 
not be too short. This would limit the scope for a long-term strategic focus and would lead to a constant 
campaign mentality that distracts directors from prioritising long-term value creation.166 Research also 
indicates that longer serving directors may be more independent in terms of the business judgment and 
analysis as they develop firm-specific knowledge and the confidence to assert their opinions in board 
meetings without fear of social isolation.167 However, some roundtables considered that excessively long 
terms, or too many consecutive terms, would result in directors losing their independent view. Overall, it 
was argued that term limits should be raised to enable a long-term perspective, but should not be overly 
long. In addition, renewals of terms should not extend indefinitely into the future.168 To summarise, finding 
the right balance depends on the specific situation of the corporation in question and the way in which it 
relates to shareholders. 
At the New York roundtable, it was argued that staggered boards can ensure board continuity and im-
prove protection against hostile takeovers169 and that therefore, board terms should be staggered.170 
Additionally, the length of term for each director should be extended from annual elections to a three-to-
five year term with a reasonable recall trigger.171
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Director appointment, training and certification
To strengthen board appointment procedures, it was suggested in the roundtables that board members’ 
qualifications and remuneration could be made public. Consideration could also be given to the estab-
lishment of an institution172 to oversee the board members’ adherence to requirements and to provide 
induction, training and certification with regard to financial, social and legal affairs, financial reporting, due 
diligence and compliance systems to safeguard corporate culture and the responsibilities of a supervisory 
board member in relation to the corporation and its affiliated enterprise.173 Such an institution could also 
maintain a public register of prospective board members - facilitating recruitment along lines of diversity 
- and a register of training compliance, providing certification and accreditation.174 
Summary
Recommendations
Boards play a key role in setting and steering corporate strategy.175 They influence cru-
cial factors like corporate values, corporate culture, and risk appetite, and determine 
the attentiveness of the corporation to the interests of its stakeholders and its purpose. 
In order to effectively fulfill their role, boards must consider the corporate mission and 
long-term value creation strategy, have a good overview of the interests of the corpora-
tion’s stakeholders, understand and assess relevant risks, and decide on the objectives 
of the compliance and due diligence systems. 
There are a number of options for how boards may be organised in order to encourage 
them to pursue a broader and longer-term view of corporate purpose but it is important 
to recognise that each corporation is different. Some corporations and their business 
may require more stability, while others must innovate rapidly in order to remain 
competitive. Their shareholder base may be fragmented or they may have a control-
ling shareholder, who may or may not be very actively involved in the corporation’s 
management. 
In this context, the roundtable participants identified several good practices that corpo-
rations may consider to improve the ability of their boards to operate with a view to a 
broader purpose of the corporation:
 → Boards should be explicitly responsible for setting the corporation’s mission and its 
long-term value creation strategy; overseeing a stakeholder consultation; providing 
a statement on the assessment of systemic risks; and investigating complaints of 
major wrongdoing by the corporation.
 → Non-executive directors could serve to ensure regard to the interests of specific 
stakeholders and to bring competencies to the board that relate to those stakehold-
ers. To discharge this role effectively, the role and mandate of the non-executive 
director must be clearly specified and has to be framed with respect to the overall 
responsibility to the corporation.
 → Boards can develop an active policy of encouraging investment by strategic inves-
tors with a consistent track record of responsible and long-term engagement with 
corporate strategy. Boards could choose to give investors, sympathetic to company 
long-term objectives, more possibilities to engage or to be directly involved in the 
board.
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 → The diversity of the board could reflect company operational environment and its 
plans, taking into account factors such as age, experience, expertise, gender, nation-
ality and qualifications.
 → Board terms can be staggered with a reasonable recall provision for incoming direc-
tors, which the board, shareholders or other specified actors176 could trigger in the 
event of wrongdoing. 
 → To strengthen board appointment procedures, board members’ qualifications and 
remuneration could be made public.

Section VI            
Revise incentive 
structures
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Revise incentive structures
It is often argued that performance-related pay is a powerful tool to motivate managers to meet the 
objectives of corporate strategy. Proponents of shareholder primacy have successfully argued that a 
significant part of corporate executive remuneration should be in the form of share options or be based 
on share price. Indeed, today, incentive plans linked to share price dominate executive compensation.177 
The rationale was that this strategy would align shareholder and management interests, which in turn, 
would improve shareholder value.178
The use of share options and incentive plans linked to share price, in combination with a significant 
decrease in the average tenure for executives, has led to pressure on executives to increase the value of 
shares and share options. In turn, this has led to pressure to employ strategic means to increase share 
price in the short term, such as the strategic use of dividend increases, share buyback programmes, M&As 
and mass layoffs.179
Although these methods tend to impress the markets by increasing quarterly earnings per share,180 they 
can have a number of adverse impacts:
 → An increasing pressure to degrade contract conditions for employees.181
 → An increasing pressure to announce layoffs to provide a signal to markets rather than out of actual 
economic necessity.182
 → The sky rocketing of CEO and top executives’ compensation,183 even though there is no clear posi-
tive link184 between increased CEO remuneration and improved performance in terms of creating 
shareholder value.185 
 → The transfer of corporate funds to executive compensation186 at the cost of investment in productive 
capacity.187
 → The diversion of resources for investment in innovation and productive capabilities to shareholders.188 
 → An increasing focus of the strategy of corporate boards on short-term value extraction and share 
price management189 and not on long-term value creation, e.g. through investment in R&D and em-
ployee training.190
As there is no evidence of a positive correlation between the use of such strategies and long-term value 
creation,191 it has been broadly argued that the use of share options does not provide utility for corpo-
rations,192 for long-term oriented shareholders193 or for broader society.194 The roundtable participants 
discussed the possibilities to develop an incentive structure that would support a corporation’s long-term 
success and strategy.
Linking incentive structures to a long-term value creation 
strategy
It was suggested at the Paris roundtable that existing executive remuneration, and specifically stock-based 
remuneration, could be made conditional on the sustained achievement of long-term goals. The variable 
aspect of salary could be conditionally paid, withheld or, in specific instances, clawed back a posteriori 
depending on a number of criteria, e.g.:
 → Instances of fraud, tax evasion, publication of false or misleading accounts and profit forecasts;
 → Successful R&D investment;
 → The achievement of ESG goals;195
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 → Effective employment policy; and
 → Employee satisfaction sustained over the long-term (defined as between 5 to 10 years); and
 → Long-term economic performance.196
To support a longer-term perspective, it was also suggested that executives could be remunerated with 
ordinary shares that can only be sold in five years’ time or with share options that vest in the very long-
term, such as upon retirement.
Corporations can also translate their key performance indicators into a matrix to identify and measure 
the net positive impact value (NPIV) of strategic business decisions to shareholders, stakeholders and 
society-at-large, reflecting both financial and non-financial performance. This practical tool can provide 
assistance to those taking decisions and also help the corporation to refine its strategy, identify practical 
problems and evaluate its ability to make its decisions in accordance with its purpose.197
Transparency of executive remuneration
It was argued in the roundtables that transparency of executive pay could help to improve corporate 
reputation. A survey of the members of the UK Institute of Directors (IoD) carried out on behalf of the 
High Pay Centre think tank found that a majority of respondents perceive public “anger over senior levels 
of executive pay” as the biggest threat to the reputation of business.198 The same survey found that 54 per 
cent of IoD members thought that building a successful corporation was the most important motivation 
for a business executive, compared to just 13 per cent who said they were motivated by financial reward.199 
In response to this threat, participants in several roundtables200 proposed full public disclosure of execu-
tive remuneration and of the ratio of executive pay and median pay for other employees.201 Setting such 
a ratio would allow a comparison of executive pay with the median pay and the returns received by the 
corporation’s stockholders.”202 Linking top executive pay to average, median or minimum salary in the 
organisation could help limit inequality within the corporation. It would also contribute to building trust 
and loyalty among employees and the general public.
Another practice recommended by roundtable participants was to limit remuneration for executives to 
salary. Alternatively, restrictions may be applied on variable pay (including share options) by providing an 
upper limit on the number and types of shares that can be owned by executives, or by following the EU 
Capital Requirements Directive203 and capping bonuses relative to fixed pay in all listed corporations.204
It was also suggested in the debate that employees should be allowed to formally express their view on 
executive compensation schemes.205 For example, they may be engaged in remuneration committees.206 
This issue is further explored in Section VII.
Summary
Incentive structures effectively determine objectives for corporate directors and man-
agers. A significant part of top executive remuneration consists of variable pay, typically 
in the form of share options or incentive plans linked to share price. This practice has a 
number of undesired consequences. In particular, it motivates executives to divert cor-
porate resources from investment to short-term strategies seeking to influence share 
price and thus from long-term value creation to short-term value extraction. This hurts 
the long-term prospects of corporations and the interests of their stakeholders, includ-
ing long-term oriented shareholders. Exorbitant CEO and director207 pay, disconnected 
from real performance, is one indication of this. 
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The roundtables identified several strategies that corporations can use in their incentive 
structures to support long-term sustainable value creation. These options may be sup-
ported by appropriate public policy:
 → Ensure that incentive structure metrics are associated with a firm-specific long-
term value creation strategy that integrates financial and non-financial objectives.
 → Make executive remuneration, and specifically share-based remuneration, condi-
tional on the achievement and sustainment of long-term goals, including long-term 
economic performance, fraud prevention and detection, ESG goals, R&D investment 
and employee satisfaction.
 → Publicly disclose executive remuneration and its ratio to minimum and median 
salaries.
 → Allow employees to express their view on executive compensation schemes.
 → Cap executive pay by reference to average, median or minimum salary within the 
corporation.
Recommendations 
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Section VII            
Stakeholders
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Stakeholders
Over the past decades, corporate governance theory and its prevailing practice have come to focus ex-
clusively on the relationship between the board, executives and shareholders in order to safeguard the 
financial interests of the latter. This development is not aligned with the historical concepts of corporate 
governance and empirical observations that other types of stakeholders are equally important for the 
corporation.208 Those stakeholders comprise internal stakeholders, like employees, as well as external 
ones like creditors, suppliers and customers. 
The success of a corporation also depends on the existence of a beneficial operational environment, 
including public confidence, relations with governments and trade blocs, maintaining long-term access to 
natural capital and guarding against systemic risks that arise with environmental degradation.209 It was 
argued in the Zurich and London roundtables210 that maintaining good relations with society at large and 
passive stakeholders such as the environment are necessary for maintaining the long-term social license 
of corporations.211
The roundtable participants discussed various mechanisms that allow for the reflection of stakeholder 
interests in corporate governance, ranging from strategy making to consultation to formal governance 
arrangements that allocate specific rights to certain stakeholders or interests. Each of these mechanisms 
is separately analysed in this report but reviewed again in this section for greater clarity and ease of 
reference.
Governance arrangements
The previous sections outlined how a corporation’s governance documents and arrangements may be 
used to protect a corporate purpose, vision, mission and values. The same mechanisms can serve to 
ensure respect for the interests of stakeholders and society at large. These mechanisms can be broadly 
classified into two groups.
Firstly, corporate governance documents may clarify what audiences and matters are material for the 
corporation. By extension, they can also specify what the corporation needs to report upon and how 
fiduciary duties and liabilities for directors relate to such material interests for the corporation.212 This 
would introduce greater clarity for directors and provide a framework for shareholder engagement on 
such matters.
Secondly, a corporation may be established or transformed – for example through B Corp certification, 
employee participation in the board, employee share ownership programmes or specific share structures 
– into a form which gives controlling or monitoring rights to stakeholder groups. Examples include worker 
and consumer cooperatives and credit unions, as well as foundations established to safeguard a corpora-
tion’s multi-stakeholder philosophy.213 
Board representation for stakeholders
In many European countries,214 employees have a right to be represented on the board. In Germany, for 
example, the system of co-determination guarantees worker representation on the supervisory board 
and one seat on the management board and traditionally banks - as lenders, shareholders and financial 
advisers of corporations - are also present on boards.215 In some jurisdictions, stakeholder interest groups 
are granted standing to sue to obtain an oppression remedy or statutory derivative action - Canada is an 
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example. In South Africa, the Companies Act 61 of 2008 gives trade unions and employees a right, like 
shareholders, to bring a statutory derivative action on behalf of the company.216
Bringing employees onto boards has been linked to better dialogue and closer alignment between man-
agement and employees.217 It has also been connected to a better safeguarding of the long-term interests 
of corporations.218 As employees make illiquid, non-diversifiable investments in the corporations for 
which they work and as employment contracts may be regarded as incomplete,219 employees tend to have 
a long-term perspective. As the interests of employees are aligned with those of the corporation as an 
on-going enterprise and with the creation of economic prosperity in the long-term,220 endeavouring to 
include employees in corporate governance can therefore help corporations to counterbalance pressure 
from capital markets and short-term investors, in particular against opportunistic hostile takeovers and 
buyouts.221
Stakeholders can also be directly involved in corporate governance on unitary boards,222 for instance 
through the nomination of non-executive directors representing interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders.223 Recently, UK Prime Minister Theresa May called for the inclusion of both employees and 
customers224 on boards in the UK.225 Similar to employee representation, other stakeholders like creditors, 
suppliers, customers, or passive interests, such as the environment can be represented226 on the board by 
the nomination of non-executive or executive directors.227 
Both in unitary and in two-tier boards, directors that represent stakeholder interests should have:
 → A mandate to consider particular interests as part of clearly defined roles, functions and liabilities, 
which must be framed as part of their overall (fiduciary) obligations to the corporation (see Section 
V);
 → This mandate reflected in other parts of corporation’s governance system, such as in the expression 
of its purpose, mission, commitments to particular stakeholders, strategy, and reporting; and 
 → The necessary expertise and skills.
Consultation
Employees, and potentially other stakeholders, could be provided with an opportunity to express their 
opinion on issues concerning the strategic development of the corporation. On a general level, round-
table participants recommended to engage employees in discussing corporation strategy as a means to 
reinforce corporate culture.228 In the Dutch Roundtable, participants suggested that the Board should be 
specifically responsible for stakeholder consultation to identify matters material to a corporation’s future 
as well as addressing them.229 
A more specific proposal raised by the roundtable participants was that employees should be allowed to 
express a view on the remuneration scheme for top executives.230 The European Parliament’s Committee 
on Legal Affairs included a similar proposal in the draft text of the revised Shareholder Rights Directive 
in 2014 but this was not eventually included in the compromise text adopted during the Parliament’s 
plenary vote of July 2015.231 The underlying idea is that such a consultation would lead to narrowing the 
gap between top executive pay and median pay in the corporation and to a better alignment of executive 
compensation schemes with the long-term success of the corporation.  
Employees can also be given broader information and consultation rights in bankruptcy or M&A 
situations.232 
The right to consultation and the right to express an opinion by stakeholders can be built in the 
corporation’s governance documents or could be required by policy-makers.
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Stakeholder and materiality analysis
Participants in all roundtables agreed on the importance of environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
reporting by corporations. The basis of an efficient reporting system (see also Section IX) is a stakeholder 
and materiality analysis that strengthens a corporation’s ability to consider the interests of its stakehold-
ers, assess the relevance of those interests, and develop and communicate corporation strategy. The 
Integrated Reporting, Global Reporting Initiative G4 Guidelines and the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights Reporting Framework recommend the establishment of such a system 
that should allow a corporation’s directors to assess: 
 → Who are the corporation’s key stakeholders;
 → What issues are material for them; 
 → How these issues relate to the priorities of the corporation; 
 → The risks of adverse impacts on external stakeholders; and
 → The evaluation of the sustainability of its value creation model. 
Overall, the effectiveness and usefulness of such a system depends on how well it is connected to the 
corporation’s governance and management.
Summary
Recommendations
Current corporate governance theory and prevailing practice largely ignore the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders, despite the critical importance of stakeholders to a 
corporation’s long-term success. These stakeholders comprise internal stakeholders, like em-
ployees, but also external ones like creditors, suppliers, customers and the society at large as 
well as the environment.
A business strategy that profits at their expense may quickly undermine a corporation’s social 
license. Moreover, as was mentioned in all the roundtables, the scale and complexity of social, 
environmental and economic challenges facing our societies requires that businesses actively 
contribute to solving rather than causing them.
The roundtables identified the following options to facilitate corporations to engage stakehold-
ers and/or reflect their interests in their governance:
 → Specify fiduciary duties and liabilities for directors in corporation governance documents 
with respect to stakeholders’ interests and clarify which audiences and matters are relevant 
for the corporation.
 → Use a corporate form or governance arrangements that provide control or monitoring 
rights to stakeholders to safeguard a corporation’s multi-stakeholder philosophy.
 → Employ non-executive or executive directors who can represent the stakeholders or 
interests affected by the corporation and provide them with clear mandates, rights, and 
responsibilities, within the framework of their overall responsibility to the corporation.
 → Provide employees with a right to express an opinion on the remuneration scheme for the 
executive directors.
 → Use stakeholder and materiality analysis as the basis for a corporation’s reporting and 
embed it in the corporation’s strategy-making processes.
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Section VIII            
Long-term    
and sustainable 
investment
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Long-term and sustainable 
investment
Shareholders have a key role in corporate governance. They have unique organisational and control rights 
in relation to the corporation, such as the right to elect directors or vote on mergers and substantial asset 
sales.233 Shareholders also influence corporations by trading or not trading their shares.
The dominant corporate governance model assumes that shareholders will exhibit stewardship by actively 
engaging with corporations and holding management to account for their performance.234 In reality, most 
shareholders are minority shareholders with limited capacity to voice their views, and many of them focus 
only on the market value of their shares, rather than on engagement with management and corporate 
strategy as a means to improve corporate performance. Therefore, the stewardship concept implicitly 
expects institutional investors to fulfil this role, that is, to provide effective oversight, engagement and a 
long-term vision of corporate strategy.
However, the rise of institutional investors since the 1980s has come together with a steady increase in 
the turnover rate of their positions235 and with a shift in focus of their engagement with corporations 
toward the creation of short-term shareholder value.236 These developments, combined with the engage-
ment by explicitly short-term oriented institutional investors, such as activist hedge funds, has lead to an 
overall dynamic in which institutional investors put pressure237 on boards to increase shareholder value in 
the short-term.238 In this situation, rather than improving corporate governance, the focus on reinforcing 
shareholder rights per se can reinforce pressure on boards to focus on strategies that will maximise the 
share price in the short term.239
In response to this framing, the roundtable participants discussed how to harness and maximise the 
potential positive impact of shareholder engagement while containing the risks of exacerbating short-
termism that shareholder engagement can also bring. The roundtable debates focused on issues of stew-
ardship, shareholders’ voting rights, transparency of shareholders’ involvement in investee corporations 
and takeover situations.
Enlightened shareholder value and stewardship
In several European countries, the public debate has focused on fostering long-term oriented and active 
shareholder engagement240 by promoting the concepts of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ and ‘steward-
ship’. For example, in order to facilitate a move away from the naked pursuit of shareholder value and 
toward ‘enlightened shareholder value,’241 the UK Financial Reporting Council encouraged institutional 
investors to exhibit ‘stewardship’ in order to promote the long term success of companies “in such a way 
that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper” and, thereby, to benefit “companies, investors and the 
economy as a whole.”242
Academic research shows that the ‘stewardship’ concept is based on several problematic premises. 
Firstly, to make ‘stewardship’ work, institutional investors need to be able to operate as a relatively tight 
and coordinated front, with clear and coordinated goals. However, institutional investment has become 
increasingly dispersed between different types of investors with very different interests, time horizons 
and nationalities.243 Secondly, stewardship implies a link between institutional investment and the end 
beneficiaries’ goals.244 However, end beneficiaries have a wide variety of goals and these interests can shift 
over time. In this respect, institutional investors revert to relative financial performance as the presumed 
common denominator.245 Thirdly, rating agencies, insurers and proxy advisers provide a constraining 
institutional setting that prioritises short-term shareholder value. This is further exacerbated by the fact 
that for institutional investors with large number of corporations in their portfolio, it may prove difficult in 
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practice to actively engage in governance beyond following the advice of proxy advisers. Fourthly, inside 
institutional investors, investment and engagement strategies may diverge between professional inves-
tors and the staff who vote the stock.246 Fifthly, the funds of institutional investors are often distributed 
through longer investment chains. This further complicates the link to achieving the end beneficiaries’ 
imputed broader goals.247
For these reasons, the expectation that institutional shareholders will provide effective oversight and 
control for the benefit of the long-term interests of corporations and their constituencies is problem-
atic.248 The underlying view is one of empowered shareholders, analogous to traditional quasi-owners or 
to families in family control businesses.249  In modern public corporations, however, most shareholders 
– including institutional investors - who have the power to engage with or provide signals to corporations’ 
boards, will for various reasons gravitate toward the use of the lowest common denominator, i.e. market 
value, as their object to engage. This dynamic may explain why ‘long-term’ investor ‘firewalls’ break down 
easily250 and why institutional investors seem unwilling to engage on central issues such as ‘say on pay.’251 
With both retail and institutional investors increasingly adopting a view on corporate governance that 
reflects the interests of disengaged investors focused on short-term market value increases, the idea of 
empowering shareholders per se by using notions like ‘stewardship’ and ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
may paradoxically end up providing greater support for the current model of corporate governance.252 
Therefore, the strengthening of shareholders’ rights without further qualification threatens to reinforce 
the broader dynamic of a short-term oriented corporate governance system, instead of providing systemic 
changes.253
To foster ‘patient capital’ that works with corporations to create sustainable wealth for both retail and 
institutional shareholders,254 the roundtables proposed several different strategies and practices:
Shareholder voting rights
The role of voting rights has changed over the past decades as a result of a steady increase in market capi-
talisation for public corporations; the increase of High Frequency Trading systems; the use of shareholder 
votes by banks and other intermediaries who exercise the beneficial rights of voting, even though they do 
not factually own the shares; the rise of (anonymous) proxy voting by such parties and the influence of a 
limited number of proxy advisers on the exercise of votes.255 These changes have pushed the capacity for 
the factual exercise of voting rights connected to shares increasingly into the hands of a limited number 
of market parties.256 In sum, while small retail investors tend to have little or no influence on the strategy 
of public corporations through the ‘one share one vote’ system,257 the market parties that do get influence 
through such a system are typically not committed and involved investor-partners but mostly short-term 
market value-oriented investors.258 Considering that a corporation’s shareholder constituency is typically 
composed of different types of shareholders with different interests, agendas, and capacities to engage 
with boards259 the roundtables explored several ways to support and empower long-term investment by 
rearranging the connection between shares and voting rights. 
To prioritise committed shareholders260 the roundtable participants generally supported261 the adoption 
of multiple classes of shares with different rights as described in section III. The roundtables also sug-
gested that corporations or policy-makers could allocate rights and incentives to investors on the basis of 
the length of shareholding or the contribution to a corporation’s capital. These options include:
1. Setting voting rights proportional to the time of presence in a firm’s capital. Italy and France have 
introduced laws relating to double voting rights for shares held longer than two years.262 Moreover, 
increased voting rights would need to be accrued again if the shares were traded. In the US, it is com-
mon for corporations to list with dual class (A and B) share structures whereby the B shares may lose 
their voting privileges if traded to another party.263 Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, has suggested that the length of a shareholding may also determine the type of a proposal that 
a shareholder can make.264 Proposals of long-term shareholders may be allowed to take the form of 
a bylaw with real effect. 
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2. Making returns on shares conditional upon the basis of the time the shares are held. Investors 
could be encouraged to remain with the corporation for the long-term by introducing time-weighted 
dividends that do not pay out in full unless the shareholder has held the shares for a pre-determined 
length of time, e.g. two years. Alternatively, time-weighted dividends could give the right to increasing 
payments over time.265 It has also been suggested that loyalty shares could give the right to buy 
additional shares at an advantageous price or that those shares could carry special bonuses.266
3. Making votes conditional on the status of shares at purchase. Voting rights could be increased in 
proportion to the acquisition of newly issued shares. Only the issuance of new shares takes part in 
the financing of firms.267
4. Decreasing or exempting capital gains tax on the basis of long-term shareholdings. This strategy, 
requiring policymaker intervention, has been proposed by Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock.268
Policy consistency, notification of substantial holdings, 
strategic direction disclosure and registration
Outside the roundtables Leo Strine has recently argued that institutional investors should be mandated to 
provide fuller and timely information about their ownership of derivatives, short positions and about their 
voting and share lending policies.269 In addition, he has argued that the voting strategies of institutional 
investors need to be consistent with the declared policy of the funds that they are voting for. In Finland, 
meanwhile, the issue of ‘hidden control’ is addressed by a mandatory notification of beneficial owners of 
a nominee-registered share in the shareholder register for the before they can vote.270
Several roundtables reflected on these issues. The participants in the Dutch roundtable suggested that 
there should be more transparency about the engagement of (institutional) investors in individual corpo-
rations in order to allow understanding of their role and influence. In response to the experience of the 
engagement of an investment fund that initiated the ABN AMRO split, disclosure requirements for major 
shareholders have recently been increased in Dutch corporate governance.271 Shareholders who take a 
considerable or controlling interest (3% or more in a public corporation, down from 5% in an earlier draft 
of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code272) should declare this interest273 and notification is required to 
state whether they object to the strategy of the corporation. 
Takeovers
The mainstream corporate governance literature in recent decades has presented takeover practices as 
a key instrument of the market for corporate control that ensures the disciplining of management and 
the efficient reallocation of corporate resources. Hostile takeovers, in which a bidder bypasses the board 
and offers to purchase shares directly from the target corporation’s shareholders, are a phenomenon that 
emerged during the second half of the twentieth century, occurring first in the UK and spreading around 
the common law world.274
The main critique of (hostile) takeovers is that they can be understood as a means to cash in on the vested 
interests of other stakeholders in the corporation.275 Well-known examples include loading a takeover 
corporation with a debt that subsequently finances the takeover against an inflated price;276 and cashing 
in on unprotected interests that are connected to the corporation, e.g. by plundering a corporation’s cash 
reserves or pension fund.277 In such cases, long-term corporate entity investment by other stakeholders is 
expropriated in order to create shareholder value.278 For these reasons, it has been argued that as a matter 
of principle “in responding to an offer, the target board should ultimately be guided by the interests of the 
(long-term) continuity of the corporation and its various stakeholders, and thus not only by the interests 
of the shareholders.”279
To support the understanding of the role and duties of the board in a takeover situation, the roundtables 
suggested that policy-makers should allow corporations to set up defensive structures against takeovers, 
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particularly when these may be beneficial to protect “the (long-term) continuity of the corporation and its 
various stakeholders.”280 Policy-makers can also allow for regulatory intervention in takeover situations 
by allowing a designated authority to take provisional measures in case of serious failure by the board to 
meet its duty to protect the long-term interests of the corporation and its various stakeholders,281 as is the 
case in the Netherlands where the Enterprise Chamber is vested with such authority.282
Summary
Recommendations
Shareholders, in particular institutional investors, can substantially influence corporate 
strategies. Their engagement in corporate governance thus represents an opportunity 
to contribute to the corporation’s sustainability and long-term value creation. The cur-
rent corporate governance model expects institutional investors to fulfil this role, i.e., to 
provide effective oversight, engagement and the provision of a long-term vision on cor-
porate governance. However, the increasing directedness of both retail and institutional 
shareholders toward market value combined with the engagement by explicitly short-
term oriented institutional investors, such as activist hedge funds, pressure corporate 
boards to focus on short-term shareholder value. This dynamic is supported by the 
threat of a market for corporate control and the use of incentive structures that reward 
both boards and executives who adopt short-term market value oriented strategies. 
For this reason, strengthening shareholders’ rights without further qualification can 
reinforce the broader dynamic of a short-term oriented corporate governance system, 
instead of fostering systemic change. 
To address these structural aspects and in order to foster ‘patient capital’  that works 
with corporations to create sustainable wealth for both retail and institutional share-
holders,  the roundtables identified several possible strategies that can be followed both 
by corporations and policy-makers:
 → Allow and use multiple classes of shares to vest voting rights with committed 
shareholders.
 → Allocate rights and incentives to investors on the basis of the length of shareholding 
or contribution to the corporation’s capital, for example, by:
•	 Setting voting rights in proportion to the time of presence in a firm’s capital.
•	 Providing the rewards of shares, e.g. dividends, on the basis of the time that the 
shares have been held.
•	 Making votes conditional on the status of shares at purchase.
•	 Decreasing or exempting capital gains tax on the basis of long-term shareholdings.
The roundtables also identified a possibility for policy-makers to ensure greater trans-
parency of investor involvement in investee corporations by requiring:
 → Stricter notification of substantial holdings of investors and strategic direction of 
their engagement in investee corporations.
In the case of takeovers, the roundtable recommended to support the (fiduciary) duty 
of the board to protect the interest of (long-term) continuity of the corporation and its 
various stakeholders by the allowing and setting up of defensive structures to enable 
sufficient protection against takeovers.

Section IX            
Corporate 
reporting
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Corporate reporting
The way in which corporate activity is accounted for is tremendously important for shaping the way 
investors and other stakeholders see and assess a corporation.283 An understanding of the purpose of 
financial accounting as well as accounting methods creates powerful incentives for corporate managers to 
adjust their actions accordingly284 and to perform well according to those dimensions that are accounted 
for and therefore, observed.285
Corporate reporting’s objective is rapidly evolving from the narrower focus on financial information, rel-
evant for short-term shareholder value to a focus adopting a perspective that looks into the future and 
outside of the mere confines of the corporation.286 The content of reporting requirements is also expand-
ing to include expectations to report on environmental and social performance as a result of changes to 
social expectations regarding acceptable corporate behaviour.287 At the same time, the public increasingly 
expects businesses to contribute to solving diverse societal needs and problems.288
However, the corporate reporting legal framework is not yet fit for this purpose. The US has adopted 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)289 and in the European Union, all listed corporations 
must publish their financial statements on the basis of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS).290 Both reporting frameworks focus narrowly on financial reporting as a mechanism to provide 
information to absentee investors and creditors in order to support their decisions. The practice of quar-
terly financial reporting, still required in the U.S. and by some European stock exchanges, further limits the 
focus in terms of relevant audiences, interests and time-frames relevant for corporate reporting. 
Roundtable participants agreed that the accounting models currently in use omit to address several issues 
that are essential for a corporation’s ability to create sustainable value, in particular information about 
social and environmental risks and benefits, as well as intangible assets. The lack of availability of such 
information also hinders socially responsible investing, presenting a major barrier to the engagement with 
and empowerment of the end beneficiaries. The legislative instruments that have been adopted so far 
with the aim to support extra financial reporting have limited provision for monitoring and enforcement.291 
At the same time, research shows that investors are increasingly interested in the value creation process292 
and that there is an evident trend among successful corporations towards reporting on long-term value 
creation in relation to the interests of all key stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, communities, civil society organisations and the environment.293 This is supported 
by research that demonstrates that corporations with a good environmental, social and governance 
(“ESG”) performance and reporting outperform their peers on the stock market and benefit from the 
lower cost of capital.294
The roundtable participants discussed models that enable corporations to account for and consider ex-
ternalities and intangible assets provided by the Integrated Reporting Framework (“<IR>”),295 and by ESG 
reporting standards. The roundtables also provided governance and implementation advice, and policy 
recommendations.
Integrated reporting
The International Integrated Reporting Council296 (“IIRC”) developed the <IR> Framework with the aim of 
facilitating the transmission of information about how a corporation uses and affects all resources and 
relationships that are important for its ability to create value.297
Reporting on long-term value creation strategy implies that corporations should explain how they under-
stand and integrate economic, social, and environmental objectives. In this respect, achieving economic 
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success by meeting social and environmental demands298 requires corporations to consider, monitor and 
integrate information in three areas:
1. The accommodation of long-term value creation, taking into account systemic risks, corporation’s 
long-term viability and social license.
2. The needs and interests of internal stakeholders, e.g. intangible assets, including both human and 
intellectual capital.
3. Risks and impacts externalised outside the corporation, e.g. relations with the corporation’s stake-
holders, societal interests, the environment and human rights.
Integrating this information can significantly improve corporate governance because it provides a com-
prehensive view on value, on the performance of the enterprise and on risk beyond its short-term financial 
position. The <IR> Framework guides corporations to account for a range of intangible assets, structured 
in six “capitals” that are key to their value creation strategy and that could otherwise be perceived as a 
waste of shareholder assets. As emphasized by roundtable participants, communicating this integrated 
view to the corporation’s shareholders and other stakeholders is key to sound long-term strategy and for 
building trust.299 It can also help institutional investors to improve their engagement with the governance 
of investee corporations300 and to communicate their strategy to the end beneficiaries.301 
However, the <IR> Framework focuses primarily on the information that is material to the corporation’s 
ability to create value for its own and its shareholders’ benefit. The reason for this is that the <IR> 
Framework is principally aimed at the providers of financial capital allocation decisions and therefore 
does not account well for situations where a corporation contributes to harms that are ‘socialised’ or 
‘externalised’ outside the firm or for positive social benefits that accrue to society as a whole. 
ESG reporting
To expand reporting beyond the interests of economic value creation for shareholders and to take into 
account the impact of corporations on the broader economic, social and ecological systems a number 
of voluntary - and increasingly also regulatory - standards for social and environmental reporting have 
been developed to guide corporations on how to select and report relevant data in terms of environmen-
tal, social and corporate governance (ESG) impact. The most comprehensive standards are the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI)302 G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. The advantage of the GRI approach is 
that it provides detailed metrics against which to report. Nevertheless, scholars have argued that the GRI 
approach could be improved by focusing more on problems with regard to hiding unsustainable practices, 
with regard to its essentially retrospective reporting,303 and with regard to providing guidance on the level 
of ambition they should be setting to reduce their impacts.304 
The roundtable participants suggested that to build a forward-looking reporting model, while avoiding 
potential pitfalls, corporations could do the following in their social and environmental reporting: 
 → Focus on the salient risks of adverse social and environmental impacts connected to the corporation’s 
business, such as the relation between corporate strategy and the planetary boundaries;
 → Describe a corporation’s due diligence systems and their application to the management of significant 
risks;305
 → Specify unambiguous objectives for eliminating or mitigating these risks and impacts, and track pro-
gress. The Future-Fit Business Benchmark,306 for example, outlines 21 environmental and social goals 
for a corporation to be sustainable;307
 → Carry out and disclose an assessment of systemic risks and explain how a corporation’s strategy helps 
it to manage these risks, while focusing on long-term value creation; and
 → Describe the results of the materiality analysis reflecting the interests and needs of a corporation’s 
key stakeholders, as well as their relevance to the corporation’s strategy.
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The roundtable participants also recommended that policy-makers could help to integrate social and 
environmental aspects in corporate reporting by:
 → Requesting ESG information be included in annual reports;
 → Providing clear indicators and methodology for specific matters;308 
 → Mandating reporting on long-term value creation strategy, taking into account non-financial capitals 
in the sense of the <IR> Framework;309 and
 → Encouraging or requiring independent verification (in the form of monitoring and assurance) to help 
management substantiate that its internal processes and the information it reports are credible and 
of investment-grade quality.310
Governance and oversight
The effectiveness of the implementation of systems that account for externalities depends on how well 
such a system is integrated into the governance of the corporation. In this respect, the roundtable partici-
pants proposed several recommendations and examples of good practice:
 → The (supervisory) board, as part of its responsibility to develop and monitor the long-term value 
strategy, could discuss principal ESG and systemic risks associated with the corporation’s business 
model and strategy;311
 → The board could provide a bi-annual statement on how the corporation meets its purpose and ad-
dresses the interests and needs of its key stakeholders;
 → The board could be responsible for developing and overseeing a strategy to fit the corporation’s 
business within the planetary boundaries;312
 → The CFO could take ownership of ESG reporting and a director could be responsible for its oversight;313
 → The incentive scheme for executive managers could be clearly linked to the achievement of the cor-
poration’s long-term sustainable value goals;314 and  
 → Both financial and non-financial performance could be monitored and measured. To enable this, a 
materiality matrix could be created to identify and measure the net positive impact value (NPIV) of 
strategic business decisions to shareholders, stakeholders and society-at-large, including their align-
ment with corporation purpose.315
Summary
The way corporate activity is accounted for is crucial to shape the way investors and 
other stakeholders see and assess a corporation. The form of corporate reporting 
used creates powerful incentives for corporate boards to establish their targets and to 
decide the means to achieve those targets. The current accounting models and legisla-
tive framework focus primarily on short-term financial information and do not address 
several issues that are essential for a corporation’s ability to create sustainable value. 
The legislative instruments that have been adopted so far to support extra-financial 
reporting have limited provision for monitoring or enforcement.
At the same time, investors are increasingly interested in the value creation process and 
there is an evident trend among successful corporations towards reporting on long-
term value creation in relation to the interests of all key stakeholders. This is supported 
by research that shows that corporations with good ESG performance and reporting 
outperform their peers on the stock market in the long-term and benefit from lower 
cost of capital.
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In this respect, the roundtables recommended corporations to consider the following 
best practices:
 → Adopt the integrated reporting <IR> framework, allowing corporations to meaning-
fully report on value creation strategy, taking into account intangible assets and 
non-financial capitals.
 → Identify and report on salient risks of adverse social and environmental impacts 
connected to the corporation’s business, as well as due diligence systems set up to 
prevent, mitigate and remediate such risks and impacts, including their application.
 → Specify unambiguous objectives for eliminating or mitigating these risks and im-
pacts, and track their progress.
 → Carry out and disclose assessment of systemic risks and explain how the corpora-
tion’s strategy reflects these risks, while focusing on long-term value creation.
 → Describe the results of the materiality analysis reflecting the interests and needs 
of corporation’s key stakeholders, as well as their relevance to the corporation 
strategy.
 → Allocate responsibility for reporting on ESG matters to the CFO and mandate the 
oversight to a director.
 → Reflect the corporation’s long-term sustainable value goals in the management 
incentive scheme.
 → Develop a materiality matrix to identify and measure the net positive impact value 
(NPIV) of strategic business decisions to shareholders, stakeholders and society-
at-large and their alignment with the corporation’s purpose and strategy for the 
creation of long-term sustainable value.
 → Include within the board’s responsibilities an assessment of principal ESG and sys-
temic risks, the development of a strategy to fit within planetary boundaries and a 
statement on how the corporation meets its purpose, addresses both interests and 
meets the needs of key stakeholders.  
Policy-makers can help to integrate social and environmental aspects in corporate re-
porting by implementing the following:
 → Request that ESG information be included in annual reports; 
 → Provide clear indicators and methodology for specific matters, e.g use of materials, 
greenhouse gas emissions, land use, and water use;
 → Mandate reporting on long-term value creation strategy, taking into account non-
financial capitals in the sense of the <IR> Framework; and
 → Encourage or require independent verification (in the form of monitoring and assur-
ance) to help management substantiate that its internal processes and its reported 
information are credible and of investment-grade quality.316 
Recommendations

Conclusion
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Conclusion
After the financial crisis, there has been considerable debate about the role of corporations in society. It 
has become broadly accepted that corporations - particularly the world’s largest publicly traded corpora-
tions – should be governed according to a broad purpose, and notably with respect for the society and 
the environment. This is due to corporations’ dependency on the broader institutional framework within 
which they operate for their social license and their own long-term survival. It is also because corporate 
governance is connected to some of the most pressing problems societies face and can, therefore, only be 
solved with a dedicated contribution from corporations. Accordingly, there is growing recognition that the 
goal of the corporation should be to create long-term sustainable value for customers and shareholders, 
while at the same time contributing to societal well-being and environmental sustainability.
Building on the expertise of leading practitioners and academics in both the U.S. and Europe, the round-
tables identified desired outcomes and key principles for a new model of corporate governance capable 
of achieving these objectives. Roundtable participants pointed to a diverse range of options for corpora-
tions, investors, and policy-makers as they looked for the most effective way to ensure that corporate 
governance contributes to a broad and long-term understanding of corporate purpose. 
Many leading companies are already guided by these principles, thereby demonstrating that the approach 
is not only possible but that it can also give corporations a competitive edge leading to better economic 
performance as well as to better long-term results in capital markets. If implemented across all listed 
companies, this emerging approach to corporate governance could help corporations to align their strate-
gies with the interests of society and take into account systemic risks such as climate change and grow-
ing inequality. The effect would be a renewed focus on creating long-term sustainable value, improved 
corporate resilience and a stronger social license.
While different options will be more appropriate in specific jurisdictions and for certain corporations, 
several issues stood out as generally accepted and of equal importance everywhere. In particular, the 
roundtables identified the need to broaden the purpose of the corporation, extend the scope of corporate 
strategy to include long-term goals, clarify the duties of directors, revise incentives and improve the way 
corporate performance and value creation are measured and accounted for. 
The roundtables confirmed that corporate law across all jurisdictions offers considerable scope in terms 
of the purpose of a corporation. The fiduciary duties of directors are typically not owed to the sharehold-
ers but rather to the corporation itself, whereas the interests of shareholders are satisfied as a by-product 
of the success of the corporation. Even in jurisdictions where directors owe a duty of care towards share-
holders as well as to the corporation, the business judgment rule entitles directors to take account of a 
broad range of issues, which they consider will further the interests of the corporation. 
However, the permissive character of corporate law does not translate easily into practice. The dominant 
corporate governance model persistently directs the focus of executives and boards on short-term in-
creases of market value, undermining the capacity for long-term sustainable value creation and diminish-
ing the potential for corporations to play a beneficial role in society. In this context, culture and leadership 
remain the driving force of the corporation and the key elements to achieve this change but they are 
restricted by the institutional setting in which corporations operate. The roundtables suggested a number 
of ways to improve this institutional setting and to support a broader purpose for the corporation and an 
emphasis on long-term sustainable value creation.
 → Firstly, corporations may choose to reflect their purpose and long-term focus in their governance 
structure, for instance by embedding these into their articles of association, choosing to register as a 
benefit corporation or seek B Corp status.  Other options to reflect their purpose are to set up a dual 
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class share system, vest voting shares in a foundation established to oversee a company’s purpose 
or engage stakeholder interests in the board. Policy-makers can facilitate these changes by amending 
corporate law to reflect best practices in other jurisdictions.
 → Secondly, the content of fiduciary duties, in particular with respect to the long-term success of the 
company, the focus on long-term sustainable value creation, stakeholder interests, ESG matters and 
systemic risks can be clarified by corporations, and, where appropriate, policy-makers. A clarified 
stipulation of duties - connected to an articulated corporate purpose - can be reflected in a corpora-
tion’s governance documents, strategic objectives, KPIs, reporting and executive incentive systems.
 → Thirdly, the interests of corporate stakeholders, in particular those that are essential to a corpora-
tion’s long-term success, can be reflected in a more comprehensive way in corporate governance 
arrangements. The roundtables considered that corporations could engage employee representatives 
and long-term investors with a proven track record of responsible engagement in their board or 
provide them with consultation rights. Corporations may also choose to reflect the interests of the 
stakeholders who cannot be directly engaged, such as the environment or people affected in global 
supply chains. This could be achieved by assigning responsibility to particular board members and 
establishing appropriate monitoring mechanisms.
 → Fourthly, shareholders do not form a homogenous group with the same interests, agendas and 
capacities to engage in corporate governance. A corporate governance system that focuses on share-
holder rights without further qualification amplifies the ability of parties with a short-term interest to 
engage. In response, boards could formulate a strategy of encouraging or discouraging specific types 
of investors. Similarly, policy-makers could adopt regulations that allow corporations to differentiate 
in their engagement with types of shareholders. 
 → Fifthly, corporate accounting and reporting could reflect a corporation’s long-term value creation 
strategy by taking into account non-financial capitals, intangible assets, ESG matters and by address-
ing the systemic risks related to a corporation’s business. KPIs and incentive systems could be aligned 
with such a reporting system. Institutional investors can monitor corporate performance in terms of 
their capacity for long-term value creation and use the KPIs as benchmarks for their voting strategies, 
taking into account the interests of their end beneficiaries.
 → Finally, the curricula of corporate law, management, accounting and economics could be developed in 
such a way that they reflect a broad understanding of corporate purpose.
The principal conclusions of this report are that there is an emerging consensus that the goal of the 
corporation should be to create long-term sustainable value for customers and shareholders, while con-
tributing to societal well-being and environmental sustainability; that these objectives can be mutually 
reinforcing; and that corporate governance should be developed to a standard where it may contribute to 
these objectives. This report identifies a number of possibilities to achieve this change.
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Recommendations
Framing of current debates on corporate governance
The different roundtables recognised that shareholder primacy is a problematic model for corporate 
governance. It induces short-termism and leads to a disconnection between short and long term goals 
in business strategy. The roundtables concluded that the role of corporate governance is not only to 
protect the corporation but also to ensure that a corporation is able to create long-term sustainable value 
for society at large. Moreover, the roundtables clearly expressed that there is a need to build a stronger 
corporate governance model, which should aim to: 
 → Create real value for customers and wealth for shareholders as joint and mutually reinforcing 
objectives.
 → Take account of environmental sustainability and societal well-being.
 → Take into account systemic risks and opportunities.
 → Adopt both financial and ESG benchmarks to measure corporate performance over the long-term.
Engaging with corporate governance
The roundtables identified several options for corporations on how to protect their purpose:
 → Embed a clear statement of purpose and corresponding rights and responsibilities of directors, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders in a corporation’s governance documents and articles of 
incorporation.
 → Use dual-class share structures with differentiated voting rights, where available.
 → Vest voting shares in a foundation set up to oversee a corporation’s purpose.
 → Register as a Benefit Corporation or other alternative legal form established to protect social purpose 
or obtain B corporation certification.
The roundtables also identified how corporate law and corporate governance regulation can foster pur-
pose driven corporations. Accordingly, this framework could:
 → Clarify in law and in corporate governance codes the societal purpose of corporations and their duties 
toward internal and external constituencies.
 → Allow corporations to protect their purpose in governance documents and arrangements.
 → Require corporations to specify their long-term social purposes in their constitutional documents.
 → Recognise a director duty to develop long-term plans in order to meet specific societal objectives rel-
evant for their corporation, and annually report to shareholders on how these plans are being fulfilled.
 → Allow for the use of dual class share structures and industrial foundations.
Fiduciary duties of directors and institutional investors
The roundtable participants identified several recommendations for how fiduciary duties can be used to 
restore the focus on long-term value creation:
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Recommendations for corporations and their directors
 → Clearly acknowledge and publicly affirm that it is the duty of directors to:
•	 Protect the long-term development of the corporation; 
•	 Evaluate salient environmental and social risks connected to the business of their corporation;
•	 Mitigate negative impact on corporate stakeholders and society at large and to specify how stake-
holders’ interests should be taken into account;
•	 Assess and address systemic risks associated with the corporation.
 → Reflect these duties and set objectives in a corporation’s governance documents, strategic objectives, 
KPIs, corporate reporting and executive incentive systems.
 → Include systemic risks, sustainability and other relevant ESG factors in ‘in control’ statements. 
Recommendations regarding the fiduciary duties of institutional investors
 → Develop a strategy taking account of ESG matters, systemic risks, and engage with the boards of 
investee corporations, reflecting end-beneficiaries’ long-term interest and time horizons for the in-
vestment strategy. Integrate this strategy in internal incentive schemes.
 → Support engagement and/or disengagement strategies, as well as positive publicity campaigns.
 → Request the investee corporations to integrate ESG factors in their reporting.
 → Align the strategy of agents down the investment chain with the specific investment strategy set by 
the institutional investor.
Recommendations for policy-makers
 → Clarify the liability of directors for serious impacts caused or contributed to by the corporation. 
 → Clarify the content of fiduciary duties with respect to specific environmental and social issues rel-
evant for particular industries, e.g. systemic financial stability in the case of banks, the mitigation 
of environmental impacts for extractive corporations, and the development of fair and sustainable 
supply chain models for apparel corporations.
 → Require greater transparency by investors regarding their engagement strategy with respect to ESG 
risks.
 → Clarify the role and responsibilities of fund managers and proxy advisers.
Broader purpose and the board
The roundtable participants identified several good practices that corporations may consider to improve 
the ability of their boards to operate with a view to a broader purpose of the corporation:
 → Boards should be explicitly responsible for setting the corporation’s mission and its long-term value 
creation strategy; overseeing a stakeholder consultation; providing a statement on the assessment of 
systemic risks; and investigating complaints of major wrongdoing by the corporation.
 → Non-executive directors could serve to ensure regard to the interests of specific stakeholders and to 
bring competencies to the board that relate to those stakeholders. To discharge this role effectively, 
the role and mandate of the non-executive director must be clearly specified and has to be framed 
with respect to the overall responsibility to the corporation.
 → Boards can develop an active policy of encouraging investment by strategic investors with a consist-
ent track record of responsible and long-term engagement with corporate strategy. Boards could 
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choose to give investors, sympathetic to company long-term objectives, more possibilities to engage 
or to be directly involved in the board.
 → The diversity of the board could reflect company operational environment and its plans, taking into 
account factors such as age, experience, expertise, gender, nationality and qualifications.
 → Board terms can be staggered with a reasonable recall provision for incoming directors, which the 
board, shareholders or other specified actors  could trigger in the event of wrongdoing. 
 → To strengthen board appointment procedures, board members’ qualifications and remuneration 
could be made public.
Revise incentive structures
The roundtables identified several strategies that corporations can use in their incentive structures to 
support long-term sustainable value creation. These options may be supported by appropriate public 
policy:
 → Ensure that incentive structure metrics are associated with a firm-specific long-term value creation 
strategy that integrates financial and non-financial objectives.
 → Make executive remuneration, and specifically share-based remuneration, conditional on the achieve-
ment and sustainment of long-term goals, including long-term economic performance, fraud preven-
tion and detection, ESG goals, R&D investment and employee satisfaction.
 → Publicly disclose executive remuneration and its ratio to minimum and median salaries.
 → Allow employees to express their view on executive compensation schemes.
 → Cap executive pay by reference to average, median or minimum salary within the corporation.
Stakeholders
The roundtables identified the following options to facilitate corporations to engage stakeholders and/or 
reflect their interests in their governance:
 → Specify fiduciary duties and liabilities for directors in corporation governance documents with respect 
to stakeholders’ interests and clarify which audiences and matters are relevant for the corporation.
 → Use a corporate form or governance arrangements that provide control or monitoring rights to stake-
holders to safeguard a corporation’s multi-stakeholder philosophy.
 → Employ non-executive or executive directors who can represent the stakeholders or interests af-
fected by the corporation and provide them with clear mandates, rights, and responsibilities, within 
the framework of their overall responsibility to the corporation.
 → Provide employees with a right to express an opinion on the remuneration scheme for the executive 
directors.
 → Use stakeholder and materiality analysis as the basis for a corporation’s reporting and embed it in the 
corporation’s strategy-making processes.
Long-term and sustainable investment
To foster ‘patient capital’ that works with corporations to create sustainable wealth for both retail and 
institutional shareholders, the roundtables identified several possible strategies that can be followed both 
by corporations and policy-makers:
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 → Allow and use multiple classes of shares to vest voting rights with committed shareholders.
 → Allocate rights and incentives to investors on the basis of the length of shareholding or contribution 
to the corporation’s capital, for example, by:
•	 Setting voting rights in proportion to the time of presence in a firm’s capital.
•	 Providing the rewards of shares, e.g. dividends, on the basis of the time that the shares have been 
held.
•	 Making votes conditional on the status of shares at purchase.
•	 Decreasing or exempting capital gains tax on the basis of long-term shareholdings
The roundtables also identified a possibility for policy-makers to ensure greater transparency of investor 
involvement in investee corporations by requiring:
 → Stricter notification of substantial holdings of investors and strategic direction of their engagement 
in investee corporations.
In the case of takeovers, the roundtable recommended to support the (fiduciary) duty of the board to 
protect the interest of (long-term) continuity of the corporation and its various stakeholders by the allow-
ing and setting up of defensive structures to enable sufficient protection against takeovers.
Corporate Reporting
The roundtables recommended corporations to consider the following best practices:
 → Adopt the integrated reporting <IR> framework, allowing corporations to meaningfully report on 
value creation strategy, taking into account intangible assets and non-financial capitals.
 → Identify and report on salient risks of adverse social and environmental impacts connected to the 
corporation’s business, as well as due diligence systems set up to prevent, mitigate and remediate 
such risks and impacts, including their application.
 → Specify unambiguous objectives for eliminating or mitigating these risks and impacts, and track their 
progress.
 → Carry out and disclose assessment of systemic risks and explain how the corporation’s strategy re-
flects these risks, while focusing on long-term value creation.
 → Describe the results of the materiality analysis reflecting the interests and needs of corporation’s key 
stakeholders, as well as their relevance to the corporation strategy.
 → Allocate responsibility for reporting on ESG matters to the CFO and mandate the oversight to a 
director.
 → Reflect the corporation’s long-term sustainable value goals in the management incentive scheme.
 → Develop a materiality matrix to identify and measure the net positive impact value (NPIV) of strategic 
business decisions to shareholders, stakeholders and society-at-large and their alignment with the 
corporation’s purpose and strategy for the creation of long-term sustainable value.
 → Include within the board’s responsibilities an assessment of principal ESG and systemic risks, the 
development of a strategy to fit within planetary boundaries and a statement on how the corporation 
meets its purpose, addresses both interests and meets the needs of key stakeholders.   
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Policy-makers can help to integrate social and environmental aspects in corporate reporting by imple-
menting the following:
 → Request that ESG information be included in annual reports; 
 → Provide clear indicators and methodology for specific matters, e.g use of materials, greenhouse gas 
emissions, land use, and water use;
 → Mandate reporting on long-term value creation strategy, taking into account non-financial capitals in 
the sense of the <IR> Framework; and
 → Encourage or require independent verification (in the form of monitoring and assurance) to help 
management substantiate that its internal processes and its reported information are credible and of 
investment-grade quality.  
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